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ABSTRACT
The engagement agreement is the most important document in the
attorney-client relationship. Properly drafted engagements clarify roles,
responsibilities, and expectations, minimize disputes, and protect lawyers
from liability to the maximum extent possible. Provisions on fees and
expenses are, of course, fundamental, but lawyers should consider a wide
range of other topics, such as scope of engagement, authority of counsel,
client responsibilities and cooperation, attorney liens, file preservation
and storage, use of technology in handling cases, and withdrawal and
termination. This article considers an important but usually-ignored
topic-choice of law ("COL") and choice of forum ("COF") clauses.
Part I of the paper examines choice of law in the absence of a COL
clause. After an introduction that discusses basic choice-of-law
principles and the importance of the distinction between procedure and
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substance, the section considers choice-of-law in three important selected
issues: legal malpractice, fee caps, and lawyer liens.
Part II turns from choice-of-law principles in the absence of
agreement o the issue of enforceability of COL and COF clauses. Part
II(A) analyzes the case law dealing with enforceability of COL and COF
clauses. The discussion shows a wide divergence among the courts in
approach and results regarding enforcement of these clauses.
The extensive judicial inquiry required by this state of the law
discourages lawyers from including selection clauses in their agreements.
This situation creates uncertainty because parties cannot anticipate which
law courts will apply to any of the varied disputes that might arise. In
short, the present situation is unfair and inefficient to both client and
lawyer.
In Part III(B) we contend that COL clauses should be enforceable if
they meet two requirements: (1) the law chosen has a reasonable
relationship to the engagement agreement, the parties, or the dispute; and
(2) application of the chosen law does not violate a clear, strong public
policy of the forum. We also argue that such clauses should not be
subject to a requirement of informed consent. By contrast, COF clauses
should be subject to informed consent because of the potential burden
that could be placed on a client who would be required to litigate against
an attorney in a jurisdiction other than the client's home jurisdiction.
The article concludes with drafting suggestions for lawyers to consider
when including COL or COF clauses in their engagements. In particular,
we offer suggested language when lawyers seek informed client consent
to a COF. If courts follow our proposals we believe that the
enforceability of COL and COF clauses will be much clearer, that
lawyers will have an incentive to include such clauses in their
engagements, and that fair treatment of clients will not suffer.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The engagement agreement is the most important document in the
attorney-client relationship. Properly drafted engagements clarify roles,
responsibilities, and expectations, minimize disputes, and protect lawyers
from liability to the maximum extent possible. Provisions on fees and
expenses are, of course, fundamental, but lawyers should consider a wide
range of other topics, such as scope of engagement, authority of counsel,
client responsibilities and cooperation, attorney liens, file preservation
and storage, use of technology in handling cases, and withdrawal and
termination. This article considers an important but usually ignored
topic in engagement agreements: choice of law ("COL") and choice of
forum ("COF") clauses.
Part II examines choice of law in the absence of a COL clause.
After an introduction that discusses basic choice-of-law principles and
the importance of the distinction between procedure and substance, the
section considers choice of law in three important selected issues: legal
malpractice, fee caps, and lawyer liens.
Part III turns from choice-of-law principles in the absence of
agreement to the issue of enforceability of COL and COF clauses. Part
III(A) examines the case law dealing with enforceability of COL and
COF clauses. The discussion shows a wide divergence among the courts
in approach and results regarding enforcement of these clauses. Part
III(B) presents an argument for enforceability of COL and COF clauses
founded on principles of efficiency and fairness. We argue for different
treatment of the two types of clauses. We contend that COL clauses
should be enforceable if they meet two requirements: (1) the law chosen
has a reasonable relationship to the engagement agreement, the parties,
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or the dispute; and (2) application of the chosen law does not violate a
clear, strong public policy of the forum. We also argue that such clauses
should not be subject to a requirement of informed consent. By contrast,
COF clauses should be subject to informed consent because of the
potential burden that could be placed on a client who would be required
to litigate against an attorney in a jurisdiction other than the client's
home jurisdiction. The article concludes with drafting suggestions for
lawyers to consider when including COL or COF clauses in their
engagements. In particular, we offer suggested language when lawyers
seek informed client consent to a COF.
II. CHOICE OF LAW IN THE ABSENCE OF A COL CLAUSE
A. General Discussion
Choice of law in disputes between attorney and client can arise in a
variety of settings: malpractice, fee caps, lawyer liens, and standards for
quantum meruit recovery, to name a few. It is impossible, however, to
identify a general rule for choice of law that applies to all disputes
between attorney and client. The interests and legal principles vary
greatly depending on the context, meaning that each issue requires a
separate analysis. This is true not only in those jurisdictions that apply a
modern interest analysis approach (e.g., New York)' but also in those
that apply more traditional criteria of conflict of laws (e.g., South
Carolina).2
Under an interest analysis approach, because "the goal . . . is to
determine, from the facts of each case, which jurisdiction has the most
significant relationship to the given situation,"3 every aspect of the
situation requires a different balancing analysis. For example, a
jurisdiction might be interested in regulating the conduct of lawyers that
are admitted in that jurisdiction; another jurisdiction may be interested in
determining the standard of care and remedies in a malpractice action
brought by one of its citizens. Several jurisdictions may have an interest
in temporary admission to practice.
For those jurisdictions that apply more traditional approaches (e.g.,
lexfori, which is used, for example, for the admissibility of evidence; lex
commissi delicti, which is used for tort matters; and place of
1. See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285 (N.Y. 1963) (adopting the most
significant contacts analysis for solving conflict of laws issues).
2. See Rogers v. Lee, 777 S.E.2d 402, 405 (S.C. Ct. App. 2015).
3. Robert C. Lawrence, III & Elisa Shevlin Rizzo, Basic Conflict of Laws
Principles, in INTERNATIONAL TAX AND ESTATE PLANNING 3, 10 (3d ed. 1999) (citing
Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 287; Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law Rules or Approach, 57
CORNELL L. REv. 315 (1972)).
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performance, which is used for contracts), it is also quite evident that the
several aspects of the relationship between lawyer and client might not
be governed by the same law: the conflict rule for the standard of care is
the conflict rule for torts while the conflict rule for fee issues, for
example, is the conflict rule for contracts.
An attorney-client relationship has some economic aspects (e.g.,
fees, liens, and trust accounts) and some liability aspects (e.g., conflict of
interest, malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty). We will limit our
choice of law analysis to three aspects: malpractice (briefly including a
discussion of conflict of interest4), fee caps, and liens.
Before delving into an analysis of which law should apply to these
aspects, a preliminary issue is whether the identification of the applicable
law is a matter of procedure or substance. If the matter is procedural, the
rules of the forum should apply. Scholars have criticized the dichotomy
between substance and procedure as artificial, but the distinction cannot
be ignored because courts use it, and because it has a constitutional basis.
Indeed, if the jurisdiction of a federal court is based on diversity, the
4. For more on conflicts of interest, see generally Barrett Schitka, Private
International Law Implications in Conflicts of Interest for Lawyers Licensed in Multiple
Countries, 60 McGILL L.J. 431 (comparing Canadian rules and American rules and
finding substantial uniformity in current clients rules and discrepancies in former clients,
because some American courts are stricter than Canadian courts in extending the conflict
of interest to the firm).
5. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87
WASH. U. L. REv. 801 (2010). Professor Main qualifies the relationship between
procedural rules and substantive rules as a "false dichotomy." Id. at 803. The author
explains that
[P]rocedure is inherently substantive, . . . and the converse is also true.
Specifically, the construction of substantive law necessarily entails making
assumptions about how that law ultimately will be enforced. Many of those
assumptions are rooted in the procedures pursuant to which a claim to vindicate
that law would be litigated ....
Once we see that procedure is embedded in substantive law, we can appreciate
the additional strain that this places on the substance-procedure dichotomy and
on doctrines that are premised upon the legitimacy of that dichotomy.
Consider, in particular, the practice of applying forum procedural law no matter
the applicable substantive law. When forum procedure is combined with
foreign substantive law, the procedure that was embedded in the foreign
substantive law is displaced. Applying forum procedural law to another
system's substantive law necessarily distorts the latter.
Id. at 802. The author discusses the origin of the dichotomy between substance and
procedure (Part I), and explains incoherencies of the doctrines constructed upon the
dichotomy (Part II). Id. at 812-18. In Part III, the author points to how procedure is
inherently substantive and in Part IV how procedure is embedded in substantive law. Id
at 818-30. In Part V, the author considers alternative conceptual approaches and ends
with advocating his own middle-ground approach to solve the issue. Id. at 830-40.
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analysis is constitutionally-based. In state courts, while the analysis is
not constitutionally-based, the distinction between substantive and
procedural is fundamental because only if the matter is substantive will
we have a conflict of law analysis (if procedural, the forum court simply
applies its own law).6 Another way of seeing this is that, for a procedural
issue, the court applies a simple conflict rule that always points to the
forum state.
In the landmark decision Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,' the
Supreme Court held that in diversity
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether
the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or
by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.
There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State,
whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial
law or a part of the law of torts. 'And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power pon the federal courts.
Without this rule, the result of a case could be different depending
on whether the plaintiff brings the case in federal court or state court.
The Erie doctrine is specified further in other important cases:
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap,9 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,'o and
Hanna v. Plumer." In Dunlap,12 the Court applies the Erie doctrine to
burden of proof. The Court distilled a rule that is narrower than a rule
that would simply provide that the burden of proof is substantive. The
Court held that the burden of proof on a particular element of a
substantive right (in that case, whether a person is a bona fide purchaser
without notice) is a matter of substantive law.13  The Court held that
whether a record title-holder must prove that it is a bona fide purchaser is
a matter of substantive law.14 There, Texas law provided that the record
title-holder was entitled to rely on record title, while a party attacking the
record title had to come forward with evidence that the title-holder was
not a bona fide purchaser.'.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (AM. LAw INsT. 1971).
7. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8. Id. at 78.
9. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939) (holding that the Erie
doctrine applies to burden of proof).
10. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
11. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
12. Dunlap, 308 U.S. at 212.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 212-13.
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In York,16 the Supreme Court clarified that the "state law" that a
federal court is bound to apply when sitting in diversity includes
"equity." The case also established the "outcome determinative" test to
identify what substantive law is. In York, the Court had to decide
whether the statute of limitations of an equitable right was substantive or
procedural.17
It is ... immaterial whether statutes of limitation are characterized
either as 'substantive' or 'procedural' in State court opinions in any
use of those terms unrelated to the specific issue before us. Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins was not an endeavor to formulate scientific legal
terminology. It expressed a policy that touches vitally the proper
distribution of judicial power between State and federal courts. In
essence, the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all cases
where a. federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the
* diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in
the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules
determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State
court.
The court recognized that the state statute of limitations was
outcome determinative (and hence substantive) and therefore was to be
applied by the federal court.19
In Hanna, the Supreme Court limited the application of the
"outcome determinative" test by referring to the Erie policies.2 0
Hanna, the Court held that even if the lack of compliance with
Massachusetts in-hand service procedure was outcome determinative, it
was not enough to invalidate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1),
which governs the service of process in diversity action.21 The Court
stated that
[R]ules of practice and procedure may and often do affect the rights
of litigants . . .. The fact that the application of Rule 4(f) will operate
to subject petitioner's rights to adjudication by the district court for
northern Mississippi will undoubtedly affect those rights. But it does
not operate to abridge, enlarge or modi2f the rules of decision by
which that court will adjudicate its rights.
16. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945).
17. Id. at 109.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 110.
20. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 477-78 (1965).
21. Id. at 464-65 (quoting Miss. Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46
(1945)).
22. Id. at 465.
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The Court clarified that "the message of York itself is that choices
between state and federal law are to be made not by application of any
automatic 'litmus paper' criterion, but rather by reference to the policies
underlying the Erie rule." 2 3 Erie-held the court-was also, in part, a
reaction to the practice of "forum-shopping:"
The 'outcome determination' test therefore cannot be read without
reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.24
Here-the Court pointed out-finding Massachusetts Rule 4(d)(1)
applies or does not apply changes the result because it results in the
litigation being able to continue or not.2 5 "But, in this sense, every




Traditionally, the practice of law was limited to a single
jurisdiction. Lawyers were admitted to practice in one state and
represented clients who were residents or did business in. that state.
Increasingly, however, lawyers' practice, even practice in very basic
areas like divorce, real estate, workers' compensation, or automobile
accidents, involves multiple jurisdictions. In fact, most states have
enacted a version of ABA Model Rule 5.5 allowing for some degree of
multijurisdictional practice.27 In the past lawyers may not have paid
much attention to the law governing their obligations, but now in a
multidisciplinary world such attention is important.
The choice-of-law issues involved in malpractice claims not only
deal with which standard of care applies in evaluating the lawyer's
conduct and competence, but also involve many other issues, such as
scope of the lawyer's duty (e.g., intended estate beneficiaries and the
privity doctrine), the possibility of bringing a breach of fiduciary duty
claim on the same facts as malpractice, statutes of limitations,
requirement of affidavit of merit to bring the malpractice action, scope of
attorney-client privilege, enforceability of limited engagement
agreement, culpability issues, and possibly others.
23. Id. at 467.
24. Id. at 468.
25. Id.
26. Id. (emphasis omitted).
27. See State Implementation ofABA MJP Policies, AM. BAR Ass'N (Apr. 20, 2016),
http://bit.ly/lhuUcVj.
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There are issues that would seem strictly procedural (e.g., statute of
limitations), but there can be surprises, for example whether an affidavit
of merit is requested to bring a malpractice case and who can give it. It
would seem straightforward to say that this is a procedural issue, but,
actually, some federal courts in diversity cases have held that state law
on affidavit of merit applies.
For example, in Chamberlain v. Giampapa,28 the court held that the
state affidavit of merit statute (New Jersey's statute) applied in federal
29
court when the court sits in diversity. In that case, a patient sued her
plastic surgeon alleging negligence with respect to her medical care and
treatment. The plaintiff did not file an affidavit of merit within 60 days
of the defendant's answer and did not request an extension as New Jersey
affidavit of merit statute requires. The defendant moved to dismiss based
on the plaintiff's failure to file an affidavit of merit.30 The court denied
the plaintiffs argument that the New Jersey affidavit of merit statute
would directly conflict with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9
governing the content of pleadings in federal actions.31 The court found
no direct conflict between the New Jersey affidavit of merit statute and
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9, because "Rules 8 and 9 dictate
the content of the pleadings and the degree of specificity that is required"
and "[t]he affidavit of merit statute has no effect on what is included in
the pleadings of a case or the specificity thereof."32 Because the court
found no direct adversity, it performed an Erie33 analysis and concluded
that
28. Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2000).
29. Id. at 157.
30. Id. at 158.
31. Id. at 160.
32. See also Finnegan v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., 180 F.R.D. 247 (W.D.N.Y.
1998) (holding that a requirement of certificate of merit is a substantive law that applies
in a federal diversity action); Connolly v. Foudree, 141 F.R.D. 124 (S.D. Iowa 1992)
(finding no direct conflict between a state statute requiring early disclosure of expert
witnesses in professional liability cases, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4)(A)(i), and concluding the state statute did not conflict with federal rule); Hill v.
Morrison, 870 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (finding that a Missouri statute requiring
the plaintiff to file an affidavit of merit within ninety days of filing a complaint goes
beyond the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, but does not conflict with
the Federal Rule, and therefore both state and federal rules may be given effect in federal
court in diversity action); Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523
(10th Cir. 1996) (finding no direct conflict between a Colorado statute requiring a
plaintiff or attorney to file a certificate within sixty days of filing complaint, and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11). Contra Boone v. Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609 (S.D. Ga. 1990)
(finding a conflict between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and a Georgia statute
requiring the filing of an affidavit with the complaint setting forth the facts upon which
the claim is based).
33. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
691
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
[T]he New Jersey affidavit of merit statute is substantive state law
that must be applied by federal courts sitting in diversity. The state
statute is outcome determinative on its face, and failure to apply it
would encourage forum shopping and lead to the inequitable
administration of the law. Further, we perceive no overriding federal
interest here that would prevent application of the state law by the
federal courts.34
Relevant differences exist among jurisdictions in conflict of law
rules for malpractice issues. Some jurisdictions apply the lex loci delicti,
while others engage in a governmental interest analysis, sometimes
attaching paramount importance to the licensure of the lawyer.
A recent South Carolina case illustrates application of lex loci
delicti. In Rogers v. Lee,3 1 the court of appeals. dealt with the law
applicable to a legal malpractice action. In Rogers, the client, Malloy,
hired attorney Lee to represent him in a worker's compensation claim in
North Carolina resulting from a fall from a ladder in North
Carolina. Malloy was a resident of South Carolina and Lee was a South
Carolina based attorney, licensed in both North and South Carolina. The
case was settled in North Carolina by agreement with the employer and
the carrier. Later, Malloy, through his guardian ad liteim, Rogers,
brought a legal malpractice case against Lee.36
The court of appeals held that, in a tort action, South Carolina
follows the choice-of-law principle of lex loci delicti.37 Under this
principle, the law of the place where the injury (meaning the damage to
the client resulting from the malpractice) occurs controls.3 8 In that case,
the injury occurred in North Carolina where the lawyer's allegedly
negligent advice led to the client's acceptance of a settlement before the
Industrial Commission in North Carolina. The client lost the right to
pursue his worker's compensation claim or to settle for a greater
amount. In applying the principle of lex loci delicti, the court
distinguished between the place of the injury and the place where the
results of the injury manifest themselves. The results manifested
themselves financially in South Carolina where Malloy resided, but the
injury took place in North Carolina.3 9 The court specifically rejected the
residence of the client as the basis of choice of law.4 0
34. Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 161.
35. Rogers v. Lee, 777 S.E.2d 402 (S.C. Ct. App. 2015).
36. Id. at 403-05.
37. Id. at 405, 408.
38. Id. at 405.
39. Id at 405-06.
40. Id. at 4064)7. In fact, saying that the law of the place of tort controls begs the
question of where this place is. A court could choose the place where the negligence
occurred, or could choose the place where the patrimonial damage to the victim occurs
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In addition, the contract of representation provided that North
Carolina law governed the representation. The court held that the COL
clause in the contract of representation was enforceable.4 1 North
Carolina had a four-year statute of repose. Applying that statute, the
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision granting summary
judgment for the defendant lawyer. The court also found that application
of the North Carolina statute did not violate a fundamental public policy
of South Carolina.4 2
Chief Justice Few, concurring, agreed that North Carolina law
governed the claim of malpractice arising from handling of the workers'
compensation claim, but other aspects of the relationship might be
governed by the substantive law of South Carolina, for example claims
against the ladder manufacturer, the floor installer, or medical providers,
some of which were located in South Carolina.43
New York, unlike South Carolina, employs an interest choice-of-
law analysis, which gives controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction
which, because of its relation or contact with the occurrence or the
parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the
litigation.44 When conducting an interest analysis for any tort claim, the
most significant contacts are, almost exclusively, the parties' domiciles
and the locus of the alleged tort. "With respect to the specific tort of
legal malpractice, 'a state has a strong interest in regulating the conduct
of a law firm [or lawyer] licensed to practice within its borders, and a
law firm [or lawyer] consents to be so regulated when it locates its
offices in a particular state."'45
(meaning the victim's residence). The South Carolina court of appeals in Rogers
expressly refused to use the residence of the victim (there, the attorney's client) as the
place relevant under the lex loci delicti. Id. A different position, which would give
relevance to the residence of the client, is also reasonable, however. See, e.g., Parker v.
Asbestos Processing, LLC, No. 0:11-cv-01800-JFA, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1765, at *35-
37 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2015). Also, it should be noted that choosing the place where the
negligence occurs might be easy in cases in which the lawyer assisted in a litigation or-
as in Rogers-in a proceeding in front of an agency. It might not be so easy when the
lawyer assists in a transaction or renders an opinion. For example, imagine that Lee-
without leaving his South Carolina office-had rendered an opinion concerning North
Carolina workers' compensation on which his client had relied to his detriment. Where
would the injury occur in such a situation?
41. Rogers, 777 S.E.2d at 406.
42. Id. at 407-08.
43. Id. at 408-09.
44. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284-85 (N.Y. 1963) (adopting the most
significant contacts analysis for solving conflict of laws issues); see also Gary J. Simson,
Choice of Law after the Currie Revolution: What Role for the Needs of the Interstate and
International Systems?, 63 MERCER L. REv. 715, 721 (2011).
45. Cobalt Multifamily Investors I, LLC v. Shapiro, 857 F. Supp. 2d 419, 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); accord Diversified Grp. v. Daugerdas, 139 F. Supp. 2d 445, 453
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A good example of the application of the place of licensure in the
governmental analysis is LNC Invs., Inc. v. First Fid Bank, N.A. 46
that case, investors in an indenture trust lost their investment and sued
the trustee. The indenture trust was secured by airplanes that were leased
to an airline; the airline went bankrupt and the trustees delayed filing a
motion to lift the bankruptcy stay. The value of collateral plummeted,
and the investors-who became undersecured-filed a suit against the
trustees and their attorneys.47
The collateral trustee, First Fidelity, sought to implead a successor
trustee and its attorneys (law firm Gibson, Dunn) for contribution. First
Fidelity alleged that "Gibson, Dunn is liable to it for contribution on the
theory that Gibson, Dunn is liable to plaintiffs and to First Fidelity for
attorney malpractice."48
In the case the choice of the applicable law was determinative, with
Gibson, Dunn contending that New York law applies and First Fidelity
pressing for the application of New Jersey law.49
New York law permits claims for attorney malpractice when the
relationship between the parties is one of actual privity, or one that is
so close as to approach that of privity. The exception to the
requirement of actual privity has been interpreted narrowly by the
New York courts.50
Instead, New Jersey recognized that "attorneys may owe a duty of
care to non-clients when the attorneys know, or should know, that non-
clients will rely on the attorneys' representations and the non-clients are
not too remote from the attorneys to be entitled to protection.""
The court found that, under "interest analysis,"
[C]ontrolling effect [is given] to the law of the jurisdiction which,
because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the
parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issues raised in the
litigation. In a tort case, the most important contacts are the parties'
domiciles and the site of the alleged tort [but] [a] ... state has a
strong interest in regulating 'the conduct of a law firm licensed to
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that "[a] state has a paramount interest in regulating the
conduct of attorneys licensed to practice within its borders").
46. LNC Invs., Inc. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 935 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
47. Id. at 1336-37.
48. Id. at 1350.
49. Id.
50. Id. (internal citations omitted).
51. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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practice within its borders, and a law firm consents to be so regulated
when it locates its offices in a particular state.52
The court held that licensure was paramount here:
That principle exerts extra force here because New York, by adopting
an attorney-protective strict privity rule, has articulated a strong
interest in protecting its resident attorneys from suits by non-
clients. Likewise, New York attorneys are entitled to rely on that
protection when they practice law in New York. New Jersey has
some interest in regulating out-of-state attorneys who enter that s ate,
and in protecting its domiciliaries who participate in out-of-state
transactions. But those interests do not outweigh New York's
interests here.53
These two are only examples of possible variations of choice of law
in malpractice actions. The difference in approaches is one strong reason
why the parties may want to include a choice of law choice of forum in
their engagement agreement. We discuss in Part III the enforceability of
COL (and COF) clauses in engagement agreements.
2. Fee Caps
Fee caps-either established by act of legislature or by court-are
limits to the legal fees that can be received by a lawyer in a contingent
fee arrangement. Fee caps are different from the ethics rule under which
lawyers cannot charge an unreasonable fee.54 However, a lawyer that
charges a fee above a state fee cap would be charging an unreasonable
fee.55
At least six jurisdictions (Connecticut,56 Florida,57 Michigan, New
Jersey,59 New York,60 Oklahoma61) have established fee caps. In the fee
52. Id. at 1350-51 (internal citations omitted).
53. Id. at 1351.
54. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) ("A lawyer
shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an
unreasonable amount for expenses.").
55. In determining the jurisdiction whose ethics rules control, account should be
taken of the provision of Rule 8.5(b)(1)(2). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r.
8.5(b)(1)(2). While formally this rule identifies the disciplinary authority for ethics
violation, it is used also to identify the set of rules of conduct with which a lawyer must
comply.
56. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-251c (2016).
57. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR r. 4-1.5(f)(4).
58. MICH. CT. R. 8.121.
59. N.J. CT. R. 1:21-7.
60. New York has four separate caps, because each Appellate Divisions of the
Supreme Court adopted a fee cap. They have very similar language and range. N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.25(e) (2017); id. § 691.20(e); id. § 806.13(b); id. §
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cap states, legal fees in personal injury cases are generally capped, and so
are legal fees in wrongful death and damage to property actions-
sometimes fees in medical malpractice actions62 or contractual claims63
are also capped. The statute or court rule may cap legal fees
significantly;64 therefore the applicability or nonapplicability of a fee cap
can make a substantial difference for the lawyer.65 Which fee cap to
apply, if any, is a critical question.
The issue is particularly critical in the case of multidistrict litigation
("MDL") with the plaintiffs and their counsel coming from several
jurisdictions. The following situation is illustrative of the issue. Let's
imagine that the client is a resident of a fee cap state ("FCS")-for
example, Connecticut, where fee caps ranges from 33-1/3 percent for the
first $300,000 to ten percent for the sums above $1,200,000.66 We
imagine first that the case is filed in a non-fee-cap state' ("NFCS")-for
example, NorthCarolina-and then transferred to an MDL (and here two
scenarios are possible: the MDL is in a FCS-for example, Florida-or
the MDL is in a NFCS-for example Illinois). We could also imagine
then that case is filed post-MDL in North Carolina or that the case is
filed post-MDL in Connecticut. In addition, we can also imagine that the
case is filed in North Carolina but then transferred to New York (notice
that New York is also a FCS but its fee caps are different from
Connecticut fee caps). We can also imagine that the case is filed directly
with the MDL, which can open two possibilities: direct filing with the
MDL in New York (which is a FCS but the caps are different from
Connecticut), or direct filing with an MDL in North Carolina.
Should the contingent fee be capped? And if so, which cap? We
are not suggesting an answer here, we only want to show how
complicated the issue can be.
To understand which law should control the issue, an important
question would seem to be whether fee caps are substantive or
1015.15(b); see also id. §§ 1400.1-1400.5 (1994) (covering legal fees in domestic
relation matters); see also N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474 (Consol. 2017) (listing allowable
contingent fees in medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice cases).
61. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, § 7 (2011).
62. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474.
63. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, § 7.
64. While in some cases the cap is pretty high, the cap can also be very low. See,
e.g., id. (capping legal contingency fees at 50 percent in Oklahoma); but see CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-251c(b) (2016) (capping Connecticut legal fees where the amount of recovery
is above $1.2 million at ten percent).
65. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, Fiduciaries and Fees: Preliminary
Thoughts, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 1833, 1857 (2011) ("Given the substantial sums at stake,
especially in high value cases, one would expect contingent-fee attorneys strongly to
prefer to file cases in jurisdictions without fee caps, other things being equal.").
66. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-251c(b).
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procedural. If they are procedural, the forum would apply its own rules
on caps, and would not engage in a conflict of law analysis. If they are
substantive, the courts should engage in the conflict analysis. If it is a
federal court, the discussion would have a constitutional basis.6 7
However, this procedural versus substantive inquiry is not the type of
analysis that courts (especially MDL) have done in fee caps
determination.
There are a number of significant MDL cases in which the courts
assume that they have inherent authority to set fees. These courts treat
state fee caps as a nonbinding factor to use in determining reasonable
fees and do not engage in a procedural versus substantive analysis and
even less in conflict of law analysis. For example, In re Zyprexa
Products Liability Litigation6 8 is a good example of a MDL case in
which the court set the fees in its discretion. Judge Weinstein, in his
opinion, referred to state fee caps in justifying the court's inherent
authority to establish reasonable fees, but he did not find that he was
bound to follow any state fee caps, including those in New York where
the court sits.69 Another example is In re Vioxx Products Liability
Litigation,70 where the court found that it had inherent authority and also
authority under the MDL statute71 to promote the "just and efficient"
conduct of such actions, to set attorney fees in the matter. The Vioxx
court considered state fee caps in determining the reasonableness of fees
but-as the Zyprexa court-did not consider itself bound to follow such
fee caps.72
A recent report from the Duke Center for Judicial Studies, setting
forth proposed best practices for courts in MDLs, 73 does not mention
state fee caps and assumes the power of MDL courts to set fees,
including the power to establish common benefit funds. The Duke
Report points out that "[c]ourts also have found the related authority to
assess common benefit attorneys' fees in the terms of agreements entered
into among plaintiffs' counsel and between plaintiffs' counsel and
defendants."7 4
67. See generally supra Part II.A.
68. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
69. Id. at 495-97.
70. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. La. 2009).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
72. . In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d at 555.
73. Jaime Dodge et al., MDL Standards and Best Practices, DuKE L. CTR. FOR JUD.
STUD. (Sept. 11, 2014), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/MD
LStandards and Best Practices 2014-REVISED.pdf [hereinafter Duke Report].
74. Id. at 51-52. The Duke Report, however, recognizes that "any matters addressed
by agreement of the parties that expressly confer authority on the court may result in
future challenges . . .. Despite a court's contrary view, plaintiffs' attorneys have not
always agreed that the settlement agreement erms vested the courts with the authority to
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Therefore, in the cited case law and in the Duke Report, the
distinction between substantive and procedural issues and the possible
application of Erie is basically ignored. This is not always the case,
however.
In Mitzel v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.," the Third Circuit held
that fee cap provisions were procedural rather than substantive.76 The
court reasoned that rules regulating contingent fee agreements are of
particular concern to courts because they pertain to the conduct of
members of the bar.77 The court distinguished fee-shifting statutes,
which it recognized were substantive rather than procedural.78
In that case, a Pennsylvania resident hired Pennsylvania lawyers to
litigate a personal injury claim that arose and was filed in New
Jersey. New Jersey court rules imposed limits on contingency fees, and
the New Jersey federal courts had adopted the state fee cap rule as a local
federal court rule. Pennsylvania did not have a fee cap provision.7 9 The
district court applied its local fee cap rule, treating it as procedural, and
the Third Circuit affirmed.o0
The case does not necessarily decide how a court in the Third
Circuit would deal with a case in which the matter was filed in a nonfee
cap state, but the plaintiff was a resident of a fee cap jurisdiction. In' this
situation, the forum would not have an applicable rule, so there would be
no rule of procedure to follow.
On the other hand, Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. v. Peter
McNulty Law Firm8' was a class action settlement that was part of a
MDL. The court held that the award of attorneys' fees was not a matter
of federal law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h), but rather
was a matter of state law under Erie.82 The court applied the conflict-of-
law rules of the transferor court to determine that Massachusetts law
governed the determination of fees in the case."
impose contingency fee caps." Id. at 52 (citing Morris A. Ratner, Achieving Procedural
Goals Through Indirection: The Use ofEthics Doctrine to Justify Contingency Fee Caps
in MDL Aggregate Settlements, 26 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59, 73 (2013)).
75. Mitzel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 72 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 1995).
76. Id. at 418.
77. Id. at 417.
78. Id
79. Id. at 415.
80. Id. at 415-18.
81. In re Volkswagen & Audi Warranty Extension Litig., 692 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2012).
82. Id. at 13; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h) ("In a certified class action, the court
may award reasonable attorney's fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or
by the parties' agreement.").
83. In re Volkswagen & Audi Warranty Extension Litig., 692 F.3d at 17-18; see also
Monica Hughes, Applying State Contingency Fee Caps in Multidistrict Litigation (MDL)
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While the weight of practice and practicality seem to support the
authority of the MDL courts to regulate fees unbound by fee caps, it
would be dangerous to give too much weight to these
considerations. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has previously rejected
a long-standing MDL practice as a violation of the statute.84 Here the
argument for applying state fee caps is even stronger because it is both
constitutional (Erie) and statutory (absence of authority to determine fees
in the MDL statute). In Part III of this article, we discuss the possible




A lawyer's "lien" is the right "to hold a client's property or money
until payment has been made for legal aid and advice given."1 There are
two types of liens: a "retaining lien" and a "charging lien."
The retaining lien is the attorney's right to retain client papers or
other valuable client property in the lawyer's possession as security
for any unpaid amount the client owes the lawyer. The lien arises as
a matter of law rather than pursuant to contract and is based on
equitable principles: The attorney has rendered substantial services
or advanced expenses on the client's behalf and should be entitled to
compensation. The lien is purely possessory; the lawyer may not sell
the client's property to satisfy the client's debt to the lawyer.
Because of the coercive aspects of the lien, some jurisdictions no
longer recognize it, and others have cautioned la ers against
exercising the lien when the client would be prejudiced.
The second form of lien is the charging lien, which is applied against
the proceeds of any settlement or judgment for any unpaid fees or
expenses due the attorney. Where recognized, the charging lien is
generally based on statute, although a few jurisdictions allow the
charging lien to be created by contract. When the lien is created by
Settlements, 91 TEX. L. REv. 961 (2013) (arguing that state fee caps are substantive under
Erie).
84. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28,
35 (1998) (holding, in a unanimous decision, that the MDL court had no authority to
reassign a transferred case to itself for trial, despite twenty years of MDL practice to the
contrary).
85. Attorney's Lien, THE FREE DICTIONARY BY FARLEX, http://legal-dictionary.thefr
eedictionary.com/Attomey's+Lien (last visited March 26, 2017); Lien, BLACK'S LAW
DICITIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
86. NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE
AND THE PROFESSION 108 (6th ed. 2017) (emphasis omitted) (internal citations omitted).
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statute, lawyers must obviously comply with statutory requirements
for perfection and enforcement of a charging lien.
We discuss here only the conflict of law issues with regard to
charging liens.
The rules of professional conduct deal with the lien under the topic
of conflicts of interest.
ABA Model Rule 1.8(i):
(i) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of
action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a
client, except that the lawyer may:
(1) acquire a lien authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fee or
89expenses ... .8
Acquiring an interest in the property of the client in the form of lien
would be a conflict of interest unless allowed by the exception. Among
other reasons, a lien can be an obstacle to the client's firing the lawyer
and hiring a new counsel, exactly as the contingent fee is a specific
90
exception.
87. Id. at 109. Charging liens are considered important to allow compensation of
lawyers, so encouraging them to perform legal services, which are often necessary to
create funds from which clients' creditors can be paid. William B. Hairston, III, The
Ranking of Attorney's Liens Against Other Liens in the United States, 7 J. LEGAL PROF.
193, 195 (1982). The important role of lawyers explains perhaps why "[i]n thirty-two
states this lien is statutory giving it priority over most other liens." Id. at 193.
88. On retaining liens, see John Leubsdorf, Against Lawyer Retaining Liens, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 849 (2004). Retaining liens are approved in almost all the
jurisdictions: "[A]uthority in all but a few states upholds it, and lawyers continue to use
it." Id. at 849. There are exceptions: "Five jurisdictions reject the lien, five limit it, and
five appear to have no relevant authority. In a handful of cases, federal legislation has
been held to preempt state retaining lien law." Id. at 851. Retaining liens are specifically
authorized by the rules of professional conduct. Id. at 850 (citing MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT rr. 1.8(j)(1), 1.16(d) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016)). The author compares the
U.S. situation to the approach of several other jurisdictions: "Retaining liens are by no
means a universal perquisite of the world's legal professions.") and qualifies the retaining
liens in the United States as "unfair." Id. at 851, 854. The author welcomes some
jurisdiction's temperament of the retaining lien-"South Carolina's modification of the
traditional retaining lien allows lawyers to assert a lien only after balancing a number of
factors, including whether the client has clearly agreed to pay the fee, whether the client
is able to pay, what less stringent means of enforcement are enforceable, and what
prejudice the lien might cause"-but finds it not enough. Id. at 876. The author
concludes that the retaining lien (which is "too coercive and destructive, yet
paradoxically haphazard and ineffective") should be abolished. Id at 883.
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(i).
90. Id. at r. 1.8(i)(2).
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There are jurisdictions (e.g., New York9' and IllinoiS 92 ) that provide
statutory liens ("Statutory Lien Jurisdictions"). Sometimes statutes
provide that the charging lien arises automatically from the simple fact of
having performed a legal job,9 3 while sometimes lien statutes require that
the debtor be notified of the lien to be effective.94
Considering that ABA Model Rule 1.8(a) (and its state equivalents)
provides that lawyers are not in conflicts of interest when taking a lien
over their clients' assets as long as the lien is "authorized by law[J" in
the Statutory Lien Jurisdictions it is certain that lawyers operating in
those jurisdictions are certainly not in a conflict of interest in taking a
charging lien because the statute makes the lien "authorized by law" for
sure. Conversely, if a lawyer operates in a jurisdiction that does not
provide a statutory lien ("Nonstatutory Lien Jurisdiction"), then a
question of conflict of interest arises and the answer lies in the meaning
of the language "authorized by law." One interpretation is that in the
absence of a statute, attorneys are prohibited from contracting for a lien
to secure payment of their fees or expenses. This interpretation seems
incorrect because it is inconsistent with the rules of ethics, which allow
such liens if stringent requirements are met. The ABA Model Rules
preclude a lawyer from entering into a transaction with a client in which
the lawyer acquires a "security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a
client" unless three requirements are met (i.e., fairness, informed
consent, and advice to seek independent counsel).95 Therefore, because a
lien is a business transaction with a client, at a minimum in a
91. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 475 (McKinney 2017). Attorney's lien in action, special or
other proceeding:
From the commencement of an action, special or other proceeding in any court
or before any state, municipal or federal department, except a department of
labor, or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, or the initiation of
any means of alternative dispute resolution including, but not limited to,
mediation or arbitration; or the provision of services in a settlement negotiation
at any stage of the dispute, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon
his or her client's cause of action, claim or counterclaim, which attaches to a
verdict, report, determination, decision, award, settlement, judgment or final
order in his or her client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whatever hands
they may come; and the lien cannot be affected by any settlement between the
parties before or after judgment, final order or determination. The court upon
the petition of the client or attorney may determine and enforce the lien.
Id.
92. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (2003).
93. See, e.g., N.Y. JuD. LAW § 475 (McKinney 2017). Other jurisdictions do not
require a notice to enforce the lien. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-2-7 (LexisNexis
2015).
94. See, e.g., 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (requiring notice to enforce the lien).
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a).
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Nonstatutory Lien Jurisdiction, a lawyer should be able to contract for a
lien to secure payment of the lawyer's expenses and fees if the lawyer
complies with the requirements of Rule 1.8(a).
In addition, some state courts may have recognized common law
liens for fees or expenses even if the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) have
not been met. Liens pursuant to such decisions should be treated as
"authorized by law." New Mexico is an example of a state that has
recognized liens by common law decision and such liens are "authorized
by law" under the rules of professional conduct. In In re Estate of
Roybal,96 the court explained that:
Charging liens in New Mexico "have their origin in common law and
are governed by equitable principles." An attorney's charging lien is
the "attorney's right to recover his fees and money expended on
behalf of his client from a fund recovered by his efforts." Authority
to enforce a charging lien arises in equity rather than purely in
contract, and the court may inquire into the reasonableness of the fee.
"The common-law attorney charging lien is not a mortgage and it is
not akin to any other statutorily recognized lien on real property such
as a lis pendens." "The lien is subject to the court's equitable
discretion for its enforcement," and it is left to the court to
"determine whether and to what extent o enforce it."97
[N.M. R. Ann.] 16-108(J) states that a "contract with a client for a
reasonable contingent fee in a civil case," as well as one "acquiring a
lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses" are
recognized exceptions to the general rule "that a lawyer shall not
acquire a proprietary interest."9
South Carolina is another example of a jurisdiction that recognizes
non-statutory charging liens, but the basis of the lien in South Carolina is
different from that of New Mexico.99 The lien in New Mexico appears to
be equitably based and does not require an agreement between the
lawyer and client. In contrast, South Carolina recognizes a nonstatutory,
noncontractual, common law lien for expenses and a nonstatutory,
contractual lien for fees:100
96. In re Estate of Roybal, 191 P.3d 537 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
97. Id. at 541, 545 (citing Sowder v. Sowder, 977 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1999); N.
Pueblos Enters. v. Montgomery, 644 P.2d 1036, 1038 (1982); Philipbar v. Philipbar, 980
P.2d 1075, 1079 (1999)).
98. Id. at 545 (internal citations omitted).
99. Compare Eleazer v. Hardaway Concrete Co., 315 S.E.2d 174 (S.C. Ct. App.
1984), with In re Estate ofRoybal, 191 P.3d 537.
100. Eleazer, 315 S.E.2dat 177.
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While South Carolina recognizes an attorney's lien created by the
common law, the lien protects only costs and disbursements; it does
not cover an attorney's fee ....
... A lien for the payment of an attorney's fee out of the proceeds
of a judgment obtained as a result of an attorney's efforts, however,
may be created by an express agreement between an attorney and his
client. 101
In South Carolina an action to enforce the lien is an action in equity,
while an action for damages for failure to pay fees is an action at law.102
In both New Mexico and South Carolina, the proceeding to enforce
the lien is equitable in nature, with the court's discretion playing an
important part. In addition, since these claims are equitably based, they
would be tried to a judge rather than a jury.103
It is also important to remember that, depending on jurisdiction,
there might be other instruments to obtain a result similar to a lien. For
example, there is case law to the effect that even if a lawyer fails to
obtain a statutory lien, the lawyer may have an equitable lien if the client
has "assigned" the lawyer a portion of the settlement fund (equitable
assignment of settlement fund)-i.e. basically a contractually created a
lien. 104
b. The Case Law on Conflict of Lien Laws
There are situations in which the law of more than one jurisdiction
comes into play when deciding whether a lawyer rightfully has a lien to
secure the lawyers' fees and expenses. Because of the wide differences
between the several jurisdictions, understanding which law controls the
relationship between lawyer and client is important for determining the
existence of a lien, the proceeding to enforce the lien, and the alterative
instruments available, such as assignment, in cases where a statutory lien
is not available.
The Encyclopedia of American Jurisprudence states "[t]he existence
and effect of an attorney's lien is governed by the law of the place in
which contract between the attorney and the client is to be performed.,"
10 5
101. Id. at 177.
102. See Lester v. Dawson, 491 S.E.2d 240, 243 (S.C. 1997). The issue in Lester was
whether an action for fee recovery was an action at law or in equity. Id. at 243. The
court differentiated the action to exercise the lien (which was an action in equity) from a
pure action to recover fees, which is an action at law. "[A]n ordinary action to recover
attorneys' fees pursuant to a fee agreement between the attorney and his client is an
action in law with the right to a jury trial." Id.
103. Compare In re Estate ofRoybal, 191 P.3d 537, with Lester, 491 S.E.2d at 243.
104. Wegner v. Arnold, 713 N.E.2d 247, 251-52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
105. 7 AM. JUR.2DAttorneys at Law § 338 (2017).
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However, this language is not particularly useful to determine which lien
law should apply because it leaves open the question of where "the legal
services are to be performed," which is especially an issue when a law
firm is located in one state and represents clients in different states.
Some case law is useful to answer the question. Istim, Inc. v. Chemical
Bank,'6 In re Engage,'0 7 and Engage Inc. v. Jalbert'08 represent
examples of these situations.
Istim is a case that ended with a quite favorable result for the law
firm (recognition of a lien for the New York law firm Willkie Farr &
Gallagher-"Willkie"), but the law firm had to litigate to the New York
Court of Appeals to have its lien enforced because both the New York
Supreme Court and the Appellate Division (First Department) turned
down the firm's claim.109
Willkie represented a client (Coronet Enterprise) in a lawsuit in
Illinois (against ETX Petroleum Corp.) and acted as an escrow agent for
the settlement funds of that lawsuit (with funds held by Chemical Bank
in New York). Coronet allegedly promised Istim, Inc.-which had
loaned $1,000,000 to Coronet-that Coronet would be repaying its loan
with the settlement funds from its Illinois lawsuit. After Istim obtained a
default judgment against Coronet in New York for Coronet's failure to
repay its debt, Istim commenced a special proceeding to obtain the funds
held by Wilkie from' the Illinois action.110 Willkie requested the
dismissal of Istim's petition and filed a cross motion for summary
judgment to enforce "its statutory lien on the settlement funds pursuant
to Judiciary Law § 475 or its retaining lien pursuant to New York
common law.""' The Supreme Court applied Illinois law and ordered
the funds turned over to Istim;1 2 the court found that Wilkie had failed to
obtain a lien because it had not given notice required by the Illinois lien
statute.13 The Appellate Division (First Department) affirmed; Willkie
appealed."14
106. Istim, Inc. v. Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1042 (N.Y. 1991).
107. In re Engage, Inc., 315 B.R. 208 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004).
108. In re Engage Inc., 330 B.R. 5 (D. Mass. 2005).
109. Istim, Inc., 581 N.E.2d at 1043.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. The Supreme Court applied the interests analysis approach to choice-of-law and
found that "Illinois' interests and contacts were more significant than New York's." Id.
113. Id.
Attorneys at law shall have a lien upon all claims, demands and causes of
action [] upon which suit or action has been instituted [] for a reasonable fee,
for the services of such suits, claims, demands or causes of action, plus costs
and expenses. To enforce such lien, such attorneys shall serve notice in
writing, which service may be made by registered or certified mail, upon the
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The Court of Appeals specified the approach to choice-of-law issues
that it would be using:'15 the interests-analysis approach, which the court
noted was of "general application." 16
Under the "interests analysis" approach, "the law of the jurisdiction
having the greatest interest in the litigation will be applied and . .. the
[only] facts or contacts which obtain significance in defining State
interests are those which relate to the purpose of the particular law in
conflict.117
The court noted that the turnover litigation had been brought in New
York by a New York corporation against a New York law firm, under
New York law, seeking to attach settlement funds located in New York
"based on a default judgment in a debt action which Istim also chose to
bring in New York."' 18 In contrast, the court found the connection with
Illinois to be "essentially historical[.]"' 19 The lower-court was wrong in
focusing on the Illinois lawsuit because this is not the "the typical
attorney's lien dispute between an attorney and a client or a party to the
litigation upon which the lien is based where focusing upon the
underlying litigation would be appropriate."1 2 0 In this situation, "[t]he
party against whom their clients may have such suits, claimi or causes of
action, claiming such lien and stating therein the interest they have in such
suits, claims, demands or causes of action. Such lien shall attach to any verdict,
judgment or order entered and to any money or property which may be
recovered, on account of such suits, claims, demands or causes of action, from
. and after the time of service of the notice.
Id. at 1043, n.2 (citing 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (2003)).
114. Istim, 581 N.E.2d at 1043.
*115. Id. at 1044. The Court explained that the traditional approach was the territorial
approach, which applied the law of the "geographical place where one key event
occurred, such as the place of the wrong in tort cases or where an agreement was entered
into or performed in contract cases." Id. This is not the approach currently followed by
courts in New York. Id. The leading cases changing the approach were Auten v. Auten,
124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954), and Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). Istim,
581 N.E.2d at 1044. In Auten, the court "adopted the more flexible 'center of gravity' or
'grouping of contacts' theory." Id "An even more flexible approach often called
'interests analysis' was utilized in Babcock, a tort case in which the Court stated that
choice-of-law questions are governed by the 'law of the jurisdiction which, because of its
relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with
the specific issue raised in the litigation."' Id. (internal citations omitted).
116. Id. at 1044.
117. Id (internal citations omitted) (quoting Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480





PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
parties to the Illinois lawsuit, Coronet and ETX, have no interest in the
present proceeding."1 2 1
The court then looked to the policies underlying the Illinois and
New York statute to "determine which State has the greater interest in
having its law applied."1 2 2 The court noted that both the New York lien
statute and the Illinois statute have the same basic purpose-to give
lawyers the "means to enforce the right to their fees"123-but the Illinois
"provision for notice to the judgment debtor in the action in which the
lien was obtained is intended to benefit the judgment debtor."1 2 4 Here,
however, "the judgment debtor in the Illinois lawsuit, ETX-not a party
to the instant dispute-has nothing to do with Willkie's enforcement of
its attorney's lien. Therefore, whatever interest Illinois might have had
in requiring Willkie to give notice to ETX is not now applicable."1 2 5
Indeed, "Willkie [was] not seeking to enforce its lien against ETX."1 2 6
Because Illinois' policy of requiring notice to judgment debtors is
irrelevant, the only relevant policy interest is that of New York in
having its attorneys fairly compensated.
New York has more than sufficient interest to justify application of
its statutory policy. As previously noted, both parties, the settlement
fund and the significant proceedings are all in New York. Even more
importantly, New York's undisputed interest in protecting its
attorneys' ability to be paid for legal services rendered is paramount
and, in the circumstances of this case, there is no contrary interest in
another State to suggest that New York's policies should not
control.127
As a result of its choice of law analysis based on the respective
interests of Illinois and New York, the court applied the New York lien
statute (section 475 of the Judiciary Law)-which does not require any
notice to enforce a lien-and recognized Wilkie's lien.12 8
In In re Engage,129 Engage, Inc. and five of its wholly-owned
domestic subsidiaries filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.
Ropes & Gray, a law firm that had provided legal services to the group in
connection with the prosecution of various patents, filed a secured claim
and was scheduled as a creditor in the bankruptcy. Shortly after the
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id at 1044-45.
124. Istim, 581 N.E.2d at 1045.
125. Id. at 1045.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1045.
129. In re Engage, Inc., 315 B.R. 208 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004).
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voluntary Chapter 11 petition was filed, the assets of Engage and its
subsidiaries were sold to JDA Software Group, Inc. 130 Ropes filed a
claim in the amount of $108,737.11. ' The firm claimed that it had a
charging lien pursuant to Massachusetts Law' 32 "in (i) certain patents and
patent prosecution actions of the Debtor and (ii) cash proceeds of a
prepetition sale of other patents."133 The liquidating supervisor objected
to the claim.134  The issue in front of the court was whether the
Massachusetts charging lien statute applied to proceeds derived from the
sale of patents and patent applications. The court held that it did not.135
To decide the issue of first impression of whether Ropes had a
charging lien under Massachusetts law, the court found that the most
important element is whether Massachusetts law applies as the
substantive law. 13 6 The court noted that neither party even raised the
possibility that a different substantive law might apply to the dispute.137
Under that perspective, while the law firm's office was located in
Massachusetts, the administrative proceedings on which the liens were
based took place before the United States Patent and Trademark Office
in Virginia.'38
The law firm relied on two cases: Schroeder, Siegfried, Ryan &
Vidas v. Modern Elec. Prods.,139 and Hedman, Gibson & Costigan, P.C.
130. Id. at210.
131. Id.
132. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 50 (2015):
From the authorized commencement of an action, counterclaim or other
proceeding in any court, or appearance in any proceeding before any state or
federal department, board or commission, the attorney who appears for a client
in such proceeding shall have a lien for his reasonable fees and expenses upon
his client's cause of action, counterclaim or claim, upon the judgment, decree
or other order in his client's favor entered or made in such proceeding, and
upon the proceeds derived therefrom. Upon request of the client or of the
attorney, the court in which the proceeding is pending or, if the proceeding is
not pending in a court, the superior court, may determine and enforce the lien;
provided, that the provisions of this sentence shall not apply to any case where
the method of the determination of attorneys' fees is otherwise expressly
provided by statute.
Id.
133. In re Engage, Inc., 315 B.R. at 210.
134. Id. at 211.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 211.
138. Id.
139. Schroeder, Siegfried, Ryan & Vidas v. Modern Elec. Prods., 295 N.W.2d 514
(Minn. 1980).
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v. Tri-Tech Systems International, Inc.140 The court noted that in both
cases the attorneys had sued trying to enforce a lien under the law of the
place in which their offices were located (exactly as Ropes was trying to
do here) but "at no point did either court rule that this is the controlling
factor . .. 141' The court concluded that in that case, the law of the
lawyer's office is not the controlling factor.14 2 Relying on In re Fitterer
Engineering Associates, Inc.,143 the court held that the substantive law
that should apply to a given proceeding should be identified by looking
to the "law of the state in which the legal services are to be
performed,"1" which in the case of litigation would be the place where
the judgment was obtained.145
The court pointed out that "the law of the jurisdiction where
judgment entered should control seems obvious: but for the judgment,
there is no right to enforce a charging lien. Applying Massachusetts
choice of law for contract actions leads to the same conclusion."1 46
While the court recognized that, in contract matters, Massachusetts
follows a functional approach (and that there were more contacts with
Massachusetts than Virginia), the court decided that Virginia law
applied:
Although the only contact with Virginia may be that the Patent and
Trademark Office is located there, the filing of the patent applications
and obtaining of some patents are fundamental to Ropes' assertion of
its lien. But for the patent applications, all of the fees are unsecured.
140. Hedman, Gibson & Costigan, P.C. v. Tri-Tech Sys. Int'l, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
376 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), modified by 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13538 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
141. In reEngage, Inc., 315 B.R. at 211.
142. Id.
143. In re Fitterer Engineering Associates, Inc., 27 B.R. 878, 879-80 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1983).
144. In re Engage, Inc., 315 B.R. at 212.
145. Id. See also John S. McCann, The Attorney's Lien in Massachusetts, 69 MASS.
L. REv. 68, 75 (1984) (opining that you should look at the law "where the judgment was
recovered rather than the law of the state where the collection is attempted"). Similar
reasoning has been used in other cases. See Lehigh & N.E.R. Co. v. Finnerty, 61 F.2d
289, 290 (3d Cir. 1932) (holding that "[t]he contract does not expressly state where the
parties intended that suit should be brought, but the employment of an attorney of New
Jersey and the bringing of suit in New Jersey indicate that the parties intended that from
the first that suit should be brought in that state. And being brought there, the laws of
that state control as to the lien."). See also United States v. 72.71 Acres of Land, 167 F.
Supp. 512, 516 (D. Md. 1958) (applying Maryland law in federal condemnation
proceeding brought in Maryland and "where the attorneys' contract for compensation
was made in and intended to be performed mostly in Maryland"); E.H. Schopler, Conflict
ofLaws as to Attorneys'Liens, 59 A.L.R. 2d 564 (1954).
146. In re Engage, Inc., 315 B.R. at 212.
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Therefore, while there are more contacts with Massachusetts, the
Court finds that the most significant and meaningful one is with
Virginia. 147
This finding had a consequence. The Virginia lien statute was far
more limited than the Massachusetts statute:14 8  Virginia requires a
contract for the creation of the charging lien and grants lawyers a lien
only in respect to actions based upon tort or contract claims or in divorce
actions.14 9 Under Virginia law, therefore, Ropes & Gray did not have a
lien for the law firm.'50 In addition, the court pointed out that even if
Massachusetts lien law had applied, the law firm would not have a lien
anyway.s1 5 Indeed, the Massachusetts statute requires a "judgment,
decree or other Order" to be entered in favor of the attorney's client; the
court interpreted that language to mean a monetary judgment and refused
to consider the patent judgment as covered by the statute ("A patent does
not order anyone to do anything or pay any money.").152
The decision was affirmed by the district court, which found that
Ropes did not have a lien, but on different grounds.15 1 Unlike the
bankruptcy court, the district court found that Massachusetts and not
Virginia law applied.154 The district court criticized the bankruptcy court
147. Id. at 213.
148. Id. '"
149. VA. CODE ANN. §54.1-3932 (2006).
A. Any person having or claiming a right of action sounding in tort, or for
liquidated or unliquidated damages on contract or for a cause of action for
annulment or divorce, may contract with any attorney to prosecute the same,
and the attorney shall have a lien upon the cause of action as security for his
fees for any services rendered in relation to the cause or action or claim. When
any such contract is made, and written notice of the claim of such lien is given
to the opposite party, his attorney or agent, any settlement or adjustment of the
cause of action shall affect the existing law in respect to champertous contracts.
In causes of action for annulment or divorce, an attorney may not exercise his
claim until the divorce judgment is final and all residual disputes regarding
marital property are concluded. Nothing in this section shall affect the existing
law in respect to exemptions from creditor process under federal or state law.
Id
150. In re Engage, Inc., 315 B.R. at 213.
151. Id. .
152. Id. at 214 ("Since allowance of the applications did not itself require or trigger
the payment of any money and no judgment, decree or other order entered in connection
with Ropes' representation, it thus follows that no charging lien attached.").
153. In re Engage Inc., 330 B.R. 5 (D. Mass. 2005).
154. Id.
I depart from the Bankruptcy Court to conclude that the attorney's lien statute
of Massachusetts, not Virginia, governs this action. I agree, however, with the
Bankruptcy Court's alternative holding that no attorney's lien can arise in this
case under Massachusetts law because patent prosecution before the USPTO
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for not having analyzed whether to apply the choice of law of the forum
state or the federal choice of law but found that the two would have been
the same ("multiple factor, interest analysis" or most "significant
relationship" analysis exemplified by the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws (1971)).15 Another mistake of the bankruptcy court
was, instead, more significant. By referring to the applicable test as
"significant contacts, rather than as significant relationship, the
Bankruptcy Court appears to have focused too narrowly on where the
most significant contact was found rather than on the state with the most
significant relationship to the transaction."l56  Under this correct
interpretation, Virginia law does not apply.
The district court discussed two provisions of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws: one dealing with the case in which there is
no COL clause in a contract1 57 and the general choice of law principles
listed in section 6(2)1" and concluded that Massachusetts Law should
apply:
cannot, by definition, yield the 'judgment, decree or other order' necessary for
a lien under this law to become enforceable. Accordingly, the decision of the
Bankruptcy Court denying R&G a secured claim will be affirmed.
Id. at 7.
155. Id. at 10.
156. Id. at 14.
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
Subsection (1) sets forth the "significant relationship" test with respect to the parties and
the transaction. Subsection (2) provides that in the absence of an effective COL, the
general choice-of-law factors set forth in §6(2) along with the following factors should be
considered in determining which law has the most significant relationship:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract,
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.
Id
158. Id. § 6. Subsection (2) sets forth general choice-of-law principles that apply in
the absence of constitutional limitation or statutory directive:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states
in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
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A broader consideration of the relevant §188(2) contacts leads to the
conclusion that Massachusetts is the state with "the most significant
relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles
stated in §6" and its laws will determine "[t]he rights and duties of
the parties with respect to an issue in contract." Without mentioning
the § 6 principles or discussing how they applied, the Bankruptcy
Court concluded that the "most significant and meaningful" contact
was with Virginia because the patent applications and patents
"fundamental to Ropes' assertion of its lien" were filed and obtained
at the federal Patent and Trademark Office in Virginia. I find this
conclusion to be clearly erroneous.159
The court distinguished the bringing of a proceeding in a Virginia
court from the patent application before the USPTO, which happened to
be brought in Virginia: "The fundamental distinction to be drawn is that
the USPTO is a nationwide federal administrative agency, not a court
sitting within a particular state."l60 Policy reasons also suggest that
Virginia law should not apply because there is no indication that
"Virginia would have an interest in this particular issue in the first place,
much less why its interest should be found paramount.
161
Massachusetts has the predominant interest under the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws (the relevant policies of the forum):
Id.
159. In re Engage Inc., 330 B.R. at 11 (internal citations omitted).
160. Id. The court stated that:
Proceedings in the USPTO are governed by its own laws, rules, Code of
Professional Responsibility, and admissions standards, which allow for
attorneys and non-attomeys alike to register to practice before the Office.
Unlike the customary approach of the local rules of United States District
Courts, they do not incorporate particular state rules by reference.
Id. The court also raised the issue that allowing the application of Virginia lien law to an
underlying patent proceeding would create a dangerous situation in which the USPTO
around the country could be bound to apply Virginia lien statute. See id. "Such a
holding potentially would give nationwide effect, at least within this federal field of
practice, to the policy determination of a single state regarding the tools available for
attorneys to collect fees for work performed." Id.
161. Id. at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court explained further:
No Virginia parties or counsel appeared in the federal administrative
proceedings at issue, no Virginia law was applied, and none of Virginia's
mechanisms for regulating the legal profession were employed. In a head-to-
head comparison with Massachusetts, whose attorneys appeared in the action, it
is difficult to see how Virginia law should prevail.
Id.
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[I]f Virginia attorney's lien law applies to all proceedings in the
USPTO, it would not be possible for R & G---or for an attorney from
any other state, for that matter-to effect a lien based on representing
a client in that forum. The Consolidated Patent Rules applicable to
patent prosecution proceedings in the USPTO indicate that the forum
contemplated a different result.162
By carving out an exception for attorney's liens from the general
prohibition against practitioners "acquiring a proprietary interest" in
patent claims they prosecute for clients in the USPTO, the USPTO
itself clearly indicated a policy choice permitting attorney's liens,
"granted by law." A determination that Virginia law regarding such
liens governs all proceedings before the USPTO would render this
choice a nullity. 16
In addition, the court noted how the Massachusetts Supreme Court
has found that "protection of [parties'] justified expectations"1 64 was a
"significant consideration"'65 in choice of law, while the case law cited
by the defendant to support the application of Virginia lien law
implicates "intent and expectation" of the parties, which is not the case
here.'6 6 In fact, in that case law, the attorneys were on notice that the law
of the place in which they purposefully brought the action (state or
federal) should regulate the relationship with the client,167 while Ropes
here was not in the position to choose the place where the proceeding
would be brought. 168
162. Id. at 12. The court referred to the particular patent rule below:
(a) A practitioner shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the subject matter
of a proceeding before the Office which the practitioner is conducting for a
client, except that the practitioner may:
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure the practitioner's fee or
expenses; or
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee; or
(3) In a patent case, take an interest in the patent as part of all of his or her
fee.
Id. (quoting 37 C.F.R. §.10.64 (2005)) (now codified in 37 C.F.R. § 11.108(i) (2017)).
163. Id. at 13.
164. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(d) (AM. LAW
INST. 1971)).
165. Id. (citing Bushkin Assoc., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 473 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1985)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 13-14 (quoting In re American Metrocomm Corp., 274 B.R. 641, 662
(Bankr. D. Del. 2002); then citing Lehigh & N.E. R. Co. v. Finnerty, 61 F.2d 289, 290
(3d Cir. 1932); and then citing Hoxsey v. Hoffpauir, 180 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1950)).
168. Id at 14. The court clarified that the USPTO was governed by its own
standards:
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The court concluded that, "pursuant to the 'most significant
relationship' choice of law analysis applicable under both Massachusetts
law and federal common law .. . the USPTO proceedings at issue were
governed by the attorney's lien law of Massachusetts, not Virginia."l69
The application of Massachusetts law, however, did not bring a
favorable result for the attorneys, at least initially: The district court
found that Ropes did not acquire a lien because the statute-at least as
the court interpreted it-does not grant a lien in patent prosecution
work.170  Even conceding that it was possible to acquire such a lien,
Ropes would have had to overcome a further burden: because the
patents on which Ropes asserted a lien had been sold, Ropes would have
needed to attach the lien to the proceeds, but the court found that this
[T]he USPTO has its own standards of admission and Code of Professional
Responsibility. Proceedings before the USPTO are governed by the agency's
own rules and regulations. Attorneys appearing before the USPTO, therefore,
would have a "justified expectation" of being subject to the USPTO rules of
professional conduct. Absent some other basis-for example, being admitted
to practice in Virginia, representing a client from Virginia, specifically agreeing
with a client that Virginia law governed the representation-an attorney
representing a client before the USPTO would have no rational basis for
supposing that Virginia attorney's lien law governed the representation.
Furthermore-and in contrast to an attorney representing a client in state or
federal court proceedings in Virginia-an attorney appearing in the USPTO
would have received no prior notice that Virginia law might apply . . . . [T]he
caselaw ... contains not a single ruling ... holding that proceedings in the
USPTO are governed by Virginia attorney's lien law, or any other aspect of
Virginia law for that matter.
Id.
169. In re Engage Inc., 330 B.R. at 14.
170. Id. at 16. The court concluded that Ropes did not have a lien (choate or
inchoate) "on the proceeds of [the] patents, applications" and patent prosecution actions
pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, § 50, because patent prosecution actions in the
USPTO, by definition, cannot yield the sort of judgment, decree, or order required for
such a lien to be perfected. Id. at 16, 20 (internal quotation marks and parentheses
omitted). The court cited to precedents of the Massachusetts Supreme Court which
clarified when a charging lien is possible-"a charging lien which binds the judgment or
money decree for payment of expenses incurred and for services rendered by an attorney
with respect to the particular action or suit." Id. at 16 (quoting Torphy v. Reder, 257
N.E.2d 435 (Mass. 1970)). The court disagreed with Ropes that there would be precedent
in Massachusetts to the effect that a charging lien is possible, not only on a money
judgment, but also "on economically valuable assets that are created by virtue of that
attorney's services." Id. at 17. Ropes relied on Webber v. Napolitano, 71 N.E.2d 612
(Mass. 1947), but in the view of the court, the decision (dealing with a lawyer who had
obtained a lodging house license for his client from the City of Boston Licensing Board
and had then retained possession of that license to obtain payment for his fees from his
client) could not support Ropes's reading that the Massachusetts lien statute would allow
a lien on values different from a money judgment (in Webber, "the [lien] statute was
immaterial to the outcome."). In re Engage Inc., 330 B.R. at 17.
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reading of the statute was supported "neither by precedent or by
logic."171 The court also agreed with the defendant that while the statute
connected the lien to the "claim," the proceeds of the patents' sale
(which was the value that Ropes sought to attach) "stem from the
underlying intellectual property of the Debtor, not from the 'claim' it
made before the USPTO for a patent protecting that property."l72
In conclusion, the court found "that no attorney's lien under Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 221, § 50, attached in favor of R & G to the patents,
patent applications, or proceeds from the sale of the same, based on R &
G's representation of the Debtor in patent prosecution proceedings
before the USPTO."l 73
Ropes & Gray appealed the district court's decision to the First
Circuit,1 74 which found that the Massachusetts lien statute was unclear on
whether it applied to interests in property like patents and, if so, whether
the lien attached to the proceeds resulting from the sale of the
property.175  The court certified these issues to the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC"). 176 The SJC answered both questions
affirmatively, upholding Ropes's claimed lien.177
C. Considerations Drawn from the Case Law
Istim,s17 In re Engage, 79 and Ropes80 are interesting in several
aspects. First, the cases show how detailed the lien statutes (and the
relevant case law) are, and therefore highlight the importance of
identifying the correct law that applies to a situation. The New York,
Illinois, Massachusetts, and Virginia lien statutes are significantly
171. In re Engage Inc., 330 B.R. at 18. The court noted the statute's language, that
"the proceeds derived therefrom" modifies not only "judgment, decree or other order" but
also "cause of action, counterclaim or claim." Id. This reading had already been rejected
in In re Leading Edge Products, Inc., 121 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990), aff'd
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7597 (D. Mass. 1991). In re Engage Inc., 330 B.R. at 18.
172. In re Engage Inc., 330 B.R. at 20.
173. Id. This is not the situation everywhere. In Ropes, the court pointed out that
there are jurisdictions that grant a lien on patents, specifying that this is not the case for
Massachusetts: "Minnesota and New York [] have held that their own attorney's lien law
applies to representation of clients in patent proceedings before the USPTO." Id. at 12
(citing Schroeder, Siegfried, Ryan & Vidas v. Modem Elec. Products, Inc., 295 N.W.2d
514, 516 (Minn. 1980); Hedman, Gibson & Costigan, P.C. v. Tri-Tech Sys. Int'l Inc.,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 376 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1994), modified by 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13538 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1995)).
174. In re Engage, Inc., 544 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008).
175. Id. at 57.
176. Id. at 58.
177. Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 910 N.E.2d 330 (Mass. 2009).
178. Istim, Inc. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1042 (N.Y. 1991).
179. In re Engage, Inc., 315 B.R. 208 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004).
180. In re Engage Inc., 330 B.R. 5 (D. Mass. 2005).
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different from one another. In In re Engage
81 and Ropes,182 the
difference between the Massachusetts and Virginia lien statutes did not
influence the result for the law firm (no lien under both), while in
Istim,'83 the application of New York lien statute instead of Illinois did
make a difference for the law firm.
Lawyers should remember that some jurisdictions grant a lien to
lawyers without requiring a lien contract with the client,
184 while others
require a specific lien contract between the lawyer and the client.
85
Further, some lien statutes require a notice to the debtor,'"
86 while others
do not.'87 There are jurisdictions that do not have an attorney lien statute
in place, and in those jurisdictions the lien is a creature of contract
recognized by courts.188 There are statutes (as interpreted by the relevant
181. In re Engage, Inc., 315 B.R. at 208.
182. InreEngageInc.,330B.R. at5.
183. Istim, 581 N.E.2d at 1042.
184. MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 50 (2015); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 475 (McKinney 2017);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-2-7(2) (LexisNexis 2015); 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (2003). With
regard to Massachusetts, the bankruptcy court has stated that "when an attorney
commences an action on behalf of his client in a state or federal court or agency, an
inchoate lien enters in the attorney's favor. The lien matures and becomes choate when a
judgment, decree or other order is entered in the client's favor." In re Engage, Inc., 315
B.R. at 214 (internal citations omitted).
185. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3932 (2006).
186. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (2003).
187. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 475.
188. Fletcher v. Davis, 90 P.3d 1216 (Cal. 2004); Gelfand, Greer, Popko & Miller v.
Shivener, 30 Cal. App. 3d 364 (1973); see also David Angeloff, A Primer on the
Attorney's Lien, CAL. LAWYER (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.callawyer.com/2015/1
2/a-
primer-on-the-attorneys-lien.
One coauthor of this article has summarized South Carolina law on attorney liens as
follows:
South Carolina law authorizes lawyer charging liens on the proceeds of any
settlement or judgment .. . but does not appear to expressly authorize liens on
the subject matter of litigation. A South Carolina opinion holds that a lawyer
may not take a security interest in property when title to the property is the
subject of litigation. See S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Op. #96-25.
See ROBERT M. WILCOX & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, ANN. S.C. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT
145 (2016).
The court of appeals has indicated that a common-law charging lien may be
asserted to recover costs and disbursements, but not to recover attorney fees.
. However, the lawyer and client may agree expressly to a lien allowing the
lawyer to recover fees out of the judgment or settlement. Eleazer v. Hardaway
Concrete Co., Inc., 281 S.C. 344, 315 S.E.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1984). The
supreme court cited Eleazer with approval in Lester v. Dawson, 327 S.C. 263,
491 S.E.2d 240 (1997). See also In re Christian, 267 S.C. 410, 228 S.E.2d 677
(1976) (excess funds of client applied toward expenses of that and prior
transactions).
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case law) that are quite broad and cover beyond money decisions,18 9 for
example patent applications;90 however, other statutes may not be so
broad.
Second, Istim,191 In re Engage,192 and Ropes'9 3 are all good
examples of why an attorney who wishes to secure his or her fees should
always contract for a lien in the retainer agreement. A broadly crafted
contractual lien avoids the difficulty of the choice of law analysis and of
the interpretation of the same and it is advisable even in jurisdictions that
have enacted a statutory lien. In crafting the clause, a lawyer should
specify the scope of the lien and how it relates to potentially applicable
statutes.
Third, In re Engagel94 and Ropes195 show that the courts tend to
defer to state law when perhaps they could find federal preemption. For
example, the Ropes court chose to give a restrictive reading of a federal
rule' 96 and to read that rule as simply recognizing the possibility that a
state statute could grant a lien on the result of the patent application; in
that case, the district court found that Massachusetts law did not
recognize such a lien, although that decision was reversed on appeal.
These cases show the importance of a favorable state statute even in a
federal judicial or administrative proceeding.19 7
Fourth, in Istim,9 8 we see the policy considerations that enter into
the decision of identifying which lien law is applicable. While in Istim'99
it was quite obvious that New York had an interest in having its law
WILCOX & CRYSTAL at 152-53.
189. See, e.g., N.Y. JuD. LAW § 475. This is probably one of the broadest lien statutes
in the country.
190. See Schroeder, Siegfried, Ryan & Vidas v. Modem Elec. Products, Inc., 295
N.W.2d 514, 516 (Minn. 1980); Hedman, Gibson & Costigan, P.C. v. Tri-Tech Sys. Int'l
Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 376 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1994), modified by 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13538 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1995), discussed supra in note 168.
191. Istim, Inc. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1042 (N.Y. 1991).
192. In re Engage, Inc., 315 B.R. 208 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004).
193. In re Engage Inc., 330 B.R. 5 (D. Mass. 2005).
194. In re Engage, Inc., 315 B.R. at 208.
195. In re Engage Inc., 330 B.R. at 5.
196. 37 C.F.R. § 10.64 (2005); see also In re Engage Inc., 330 B.R. at 12-13 (quoting
37 C.F.R. § 10.64 (repealed 2013)). This rule is now codified with minor modifications
in 37 C.F.R. § 11.108(i) (2017).
197. While the court's interpretation of 37 C.F.R. § 10.64(a)(1) (now codified in 37
C.F.R. § 11.108(i) (2017)) is justified by the language "granted by law" (now "authorized
by law"), a better interpretation recognizing the federal interest in uniformity in patent
rules would be to read the provision as allowing an attorney to take an interest in a patent,
independently of the existence of a state statute to that effect.
198. Istim, Inc. v. Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1042 (N.Y. 1991).
199. Id.
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applied and Illinois did not, in other cases, the balance-of-interest
analysis could cause unexpected results.
Fifth, In re Engage2 0 0 and RopeS201 implicitly recognized that a
contractual lien would have been enforceable by virtue of a choice-of-
law clause. In In re Engage, the court specifies:
In the absence of a choice of law by the parties, their rights are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that
issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the
parties .2.. 02
The court then went on to recognize the parties could enter into a
choice-of-law clause.2 03 The Ropes court agreed:
[W]here the parties to a contract have failed to make an effective
choice of law themselves, the Restatement states that the contacts to
be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include . 204
These authorities point to the importance of having a COL clause in
the retainer agreement, which we discuss in Part III below.
III. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF COL AND COF CLAUSES IN
ENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS?
A. The Spectrum in the Case Law from Strict Scrutiny to Similar
Treatment of Clauses in Commercial Contracts
Forum selection clauses in lawyer engagement agreements are not
per se unenforceable. However, courts' decisions show a spectrum of
approaches from strict scrutiny of the enforceability of such clauses
based on requirements of informed consent and public policy to
200. In re Engage, Inc., 315 B.R. 208 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004).
201. In re Engage Inc., 330 B.R. 5 (D. Mass. 2005).
202. In re Engage, Inc., 315 B.R. at 213 n.5 (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW §§ 186-87 (AM.
LAW INST. 1971)).
203. The court cited with approval E.H. Schopler, supra note 145: "The general rule
that the true test for the determination of the proper law of contract is, in the absence of a
countervailing public policy, the intent of the parties, express or implied, has been
applied in deciding questions of choice of law with respect to attorney's liens." In re
Engage, Inc., 315 B.R. at 212 (quoting Schopler, supra). However, a contract between
an attorney and his client does not ordinarily contain express provisions as to the
governing law. One of the arguments of this article is that lawyers should include choice-
of-law provisions in their engagement agreements.
204. See In re Engage Inc., 330 B.R. at 10 (emphasis added). It is worth mentioning
that in In re Engage, the bankruptcy court noted that "Ropes has not suggested that its
contract with the debtor, if it is express, designated Massachusetts law as controlling any
fee disputes." In re Engage, Inc., 315 B.R. at 212 n.4.
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treatment of such clauses like the ones found in agreements between
commercial parties.
Falk & Fish, L.L.P. v. Pinkston's Lawnmower & Equipment, Inc.205
is an example of the strict scrutiny that courts give to COF clauses in
client-attorney agreements. Pinkston's Lawnmower and Equipment, Inc.
("PLE") was a North Carolina corporation with its principal place of
business in North Carolina. Its president Randy Pinkston ("Pinkston")
was a North Carolina resident. Attorney Robert Hardy Falk ("Falk")
(licensed to practice law in North Carolina and Texas) was the managing
partner of Falk Fish, L.L.P. ("Falk Fish"), a Texas law firm. PLE hired
Falk to represent it in a lawsuit in North Carolina federal court. Falk
represented PLE from October 2005 to March 2006, when the parties
entered into an engagement agreement. The lawsuit was not successful;
PLE failed to pay for the legal services and Falk sued in Dallas County,
Texas, alleging that the engagement agreement contained consent to
jurisdiction in Texas.206 The clause read as follows: "You agree our
relationship and our agreement is controlled by Texas law, and the
applicable courts of Dallas, Texas shall be thefor a [sic] for all attorney-
client disputes."20 7  Pinkston made a special appearance, contesting
jurisdiction and rendering an affidavit stating that Falk had not explained
the significance of the clause to him; 20 8 Falk, conversely, testified that he
had explained the meaning of the clause to his client but the latter had
not read the engagement before signing it.
20 9
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Falk filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled; an
appeal followed.210 Falk contested the lower court's decision because it
failed to consider the engagement agreement's forum selection clause,211
205. Falk & Fish, L.L.P. v. Pinkston's Lawnmower & Equip., Inc., 317 S.W.3d 523
(Tex. 2010).
206. Id. at 525.
207. Id.
208. Pinkston's affidavit provided:
At no time before signing the Engagement Agreement did Robert Falk advise
me that any dispute between Pinkston Lawnmower and Falk Fish, LLP would
have to be resolved in Dallas, Texas. Nor did Mr. Falk advise me that Pinkston
Lawnmower, by signing the agreement, was waiving its right to litigate any
disputes with Falk Fish, LLP in North Carolina. At the time I signed the
Engagement Agreement, I did not understand that Pinkston Lawnmower was
agreeing to litigate any disputes with Falk Fish, LLP in Texas and I believed
that any such disputes would be resolved in North Carolina.
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while PLE contended that "the provision is unintelligible and therefore,
unenforceable."212
The Texas Court of Appeals posited that "[florum selection clauses
are generally enforceable."2 13 The Court pointed out that while "[t]he
plain and unequivocal language of the provision does not include the
words 'forum' or 'jurisdiction,' two words commonly included in forum
selection clauses . . . [w]ith respect to typographical errors, written
contracts will be construed according to the intention of the parties,
notwithstanding errors and omissions, by perusing the entire document
and to this end, words, names, and phrases obviously intended may be
supplied."2 14  Here, the court said, "[a]fter examining the entire
agreement as a whole in an effort to harmonize and give effect to the
provision in question, we conclude the provision is not ambiguous. The
typographical error 'for a' may be interpreted to mean 'forum' and thus
give meaning to the provision."215
The analysis of the Court did not stop there, however. In the case of
an engagement agreement, special considerations are warranted. First,
the court expressed concern that an engagement agreement, signed after
the representation had started,2 16 required "special scrutiny" because the
clause might have been the result of pressure by the lawyer. Second, the
Court referred to the need to take into account "ethical
consderaions,,217considerations. In particular, a lawyer must maintain "the highest
standards of conduct and fair dealing when contracting with a client or
otherwise taking a position adverse to the client's interests" and has "the
burden of clarifying attorney-client agreements. This is fair not only
because the lawyer is more knowledgeable about (and more experienced
with) those agreements, but also because the client trusted him.219 Third,
recalling the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 18
cmt. h, the Court pointed out that "contracts between an attorney and
212. Id. at 527. The law firm conceded that the provision contained "a typographical
error, 'for a' instead of 'forum,' but argues the omission of the word 'forum' does not
matter because Pinkston did not read the contract before signing it." Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 527-28.
215. Falk, 317 S.W.3d at 528.
216. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 18 cmt.
c (AM. LAW INST. 2000) ("[C]1ient lawyer fee contracts entered into after the matter in
question is under way are subject to special scrutiny.")). A client might accept such an
agreement because it is difficult or expensive to change attorneys after representation has
begun or a client might be reluctant to suggest changes to the terms proposed by the
attorney in the agreement." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
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client should first be construed from the standpoint of a reasonable
person in the client's circumstances," the reason being, among others,
that "attorneys are more able than most clients to detect and repair
omissions or ambiguities in attorney-client agreements."2 2 0 Fourth, other
rules of interpretation matter ("such as the contract language, the
circumstances in which the contract was made, the client's sophistication
and experience in retaining and compensating attorneys and whether the
contract terms were truly negotiated")221 and, in that case, operated to the
disadvantage of Falk:
In this case, we do not have a sophisticated and experienced client
who vigorously negotiated the fee agreement with his attorney.
Instead, the record reflects that Pinkston, who signed the contract as
president of PLE, is an unsophisticated and inexperienced individual
whose attorney presented an already drafted agreement six months
after representation had begun. There is nothing in the record to
indicate the agreement was negotiated. According to the record,
Pinkston signed the agreement without reading it . . . . [E]ven if
Pinkston had read the contract prior to signing it, the drafting error by
Falk & Fish resulted in a provision that was not a clear forum
selection clause.222
In conclusion, the Court stated: "Given the language of the contract,
the circumstances in which it was made, the client's lack -of
sophistication and experience in retaining lawyers and the lack of
negotiation, we conclude Falk Fish had the burden of ensuring the
contract clearly stated any terms that diverged from PLEs
,,223
expectations.
But this is not all. The court also found that the forum selection
clause was unreasonable and unjust in that case because: (i) Pinkston, at
the time when it entered into the attorney-client agreement, "did not
contemplate litigating in Texas"; (ii) Pinkston had "hired Falk, an
attorney licensed in North Carolina, to represent PLE in litigation in
North Carolina;" (iii) the agreement did not contain a clear, explicit COF
clause; and (iv) the clause had to be "harmonized and interpreted in order
to ascertain that it is a forum selection clause" such that there was not "a
220. Id. at 529 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 18
cmt. h).
221. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 18 cmt.
h).
222. Id. The Court acknowledged that there was a disagreement of fact as to whether
Falk explained the clause and its significance to Pinkston, but blamed Falk for how he
handled the issue: "We question why Falk did not detect and correct the typographical
error at the time he explained to Pinkston that the provision in question meant that any
attorney-client disputes would be litigated in the applicable courts of Dallas, Texas." Id.
223. Id.
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mutually agreed forum, or that such forum was foreseeable at the time of
contracting."2 24
In conclusion, finding that "the forum selection clause was not clear
on its face and required interpretation," the court concluded that "PLE
did not consent to personal jurisdiction in Dallas, Texas."225 The court
also concluded that "enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust," and
affirmed the lower court's dismissal.226
In Falk, the problem was not so much the misspelling. Falk stands
for the proposition that a COL/COF clause requires a client's informed
consent and reasonableness.
The approach used by the Falk court has been used by other courts.
In Brown v. Partipilo,22 7 a federal court in the Fourth Circuit held that a
forum selection and a choice of law clause were unenforceable for lack
of informed consent and on public policy grounds.228 In that case, unlike
Falk, there was no misspelling and the language was clear.229 In 2006,
authorities charged Lael Brown, who lived with his father in West
Virginia, With several felonies. Brown qualified for court-appointed
counsel, and the court appointed Cheryl Warman, a West Virginia
attorney, to represent him. Warman reached a plea agreement with the
230state.
Before the plea hearing, Brown's mother, who was from New York,
retained a law firm, named America's Criminal Defense Group (ACDG),
to represent her son. While the law firm's website-which did not list a
mailing or physical address-advertises that the firm practices
nationwide and solicits contact through email or a toll-free telephone
number, in reality, ACDG is a California firm and Partipilo, its
Managing Director, is a California attorney. "[T]he firm offered to
represent Brown in exchange for a nonrefundable flat fee of $27,900.",231
The family (mother, father, and grandfather) pooled their funds to pay
this fee and retained ACDG. "ACDG then sent copies of a retainer
agreement to all three."232 The mother and the grandfather signed the
224. Id. at 529-30.
225. Falk, 317 S.W.3d at 530.
226. Id.
227. Brown v. Partipilo, No. 1:1OCV110, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108106 (N.D.W.
Va. Oct. 8, 2010).
228. Id. at *13-25.
229. Bruce A. Green, The Perils of Sloppy Engagement Agreements, LITIG., Fall
2011, at 6.
230. Brown, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108106, at *2.
231. Id. at *3.
232. Id.
721
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
agreement, while the father initialed some pages and authorized
payments. The client never signed it.23 3
On the day of the hearing, "ACDG contacted Warman to advise her
that it had been retained to represent Brown" and that she should ask for
a continuance, which she did. On the same day, ACDG associated in the
case John Brooks, an attorney practicing in Monongalia County, with
whom ACDG had never worked before.23 4 Brooks took over the case,
reached a plea agreement with the state, and received approximately
$5,400 from ACDG for his services. He "never entered into a separate
contract with Brown or any of his relatives;" ACDG never entered an
appearance in the case.235
The Browns sued ACDG and Partipilo, claiming that ACDG's
website and statements fraudulently induced them into signing the
contract, that ACDG did not provide a team of experienced attorneys as
promised, and that it failed to pursue a jury trial. Plaintiffs sought
recovery of the legal fees paid on the grounds that the charges were
unreasonable under the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct and
unconscionable, and that the representation provided by ACDG was
negligent (because the law firm failed to investigate the case and to raise
a mental illness defense or mitigation argument). The action, initially
brought in a West Virginia state court, was removed to federal court.236
The defendants sought dismissal of the action based on the
following COL and COF clause included in the retainer agreement: The
"agreement shall be interpreted under the laws of the state of California
and jurisdiction and venue shall be exclusively in the county of Los
Angeles in the state of California."23 7
The court dismissed offhand plaintiffs' argument that the father and
son were not bound by the contract (and so by the forum selection and
choice of law) because they did not sign the agreement; the father
obviously agreed and the son was the intended beneficiary.238 The court
also noted that the language of the clause was clear,239 mandatory (not
permissive),24 0 and not procured by fraud.24 1 The court also found that
litigation in California would not deny the plaintiffs a remedy.242
However, the court ruled that
233. Id. at *2-4.
234. Id at *4.
235. Id. at *4-5.
236. Id. at *5-6.
237. Id. at *6.
238. Id. at *10-11.
239. Id. at *11.
240. Brown, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108106, at *11.
241. Id. at *11-12.
242. Id at *12-13.
722 [Vol. 121:3
2017] CHOICE OF LAW IN LAWYERS' ENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
[The provision] ... is not ... written in the type of plain English that
a lawyer could reasonably assume any criminal defendant or his
family would understand without explanation. The words
'jurisdiction' and 'venue,' while not ambiguous, are not in common
usage outside of the legal world. Moreover, the apparent failure of
any ACDG attorney to explain the contract and the plaintiffs'
averments that none of them understood the provision's
consequences supports a conclusion that the provision was not
adequately communicated to the plaintiffs. Under the first element of
Caperton, [Caperton v. AT. Massey Coal Co., 223 W. Va. 624, 679
S.E.2d 223, 235 (W. Va. 2008)], therefore, the clause must be set
aside.243
Relying on Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers,2 44
the court noted that an attorney has the duty to "ensure that the client"
clearly "understands the nature of the contract and the representation ...
.",245 "[T]he attorney is under a duty to deal fairly with the principal in
arranging the terms of the employment."24 6
The court cited Fal 4 7 for the principle that attorneys have
obligations which are "different from any other businessman's in an
arms-length transaction[;]" 24 8 his "standards of conduct and fair dealing"
when negotiating with his clients are necessarily higher.249
Here, no attorney from ACDG explained the contract to the plaintiffs
. . . . The defendants rely on the following language near the end of
their contract with the plaintiffs to establish that any failure to
understand the agreement is the clients' responsibility:
Please read this agreement carefully. It is important that our
agreement be totally complete and that the undersigned
243. Id. at *13-14 (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 235
(W. Va. 2008)).
244. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 18, cmt. d (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
245. Brown, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108106, at *14. The court explained:
When negotiating a contract for representation, an attorney necessarily has a
conflict of interest. The lawyer is desirous of fair compensation for his
services, but must keep in mind that, even at the outset of the relationship, he is
also his client's fiduciary. Thus, the lawyer must carefully ensure that the
client understands the nature of the contract and the representation.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 18, cmt. d).
246. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 18, cmt.
e).
247. Falk & Fish, L.L.P. v. Pinkston's Lawnmower & Equip., 317 S.W.3d 523 (Tex.
App. 2010).
248. Brown, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108106, at *15.
249. Id. (quoting Falk & Fish, 317 S.W.3d at 528).
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understands everything before signing. If you have any
questions regarding this agreement now is the time to ask.
Once this agreement has been signed it will be concluded that
the undersigned completely understands it.250
The court continued, noting that "[a] lawyer is free to draft such
exculpatory language for a client, but not to shield himself with the legal
fiction that, by signing a document, his client actually understands each
provision. He cannot disclaim his burden to explain the agreement o the
lay client."251
The court rejected the position of the defendants that the
engagement agreement should be interpreted as "any other agreement to
provide services"252 because it cannot "ignore both the. inherently
unequal nature of the parties' positions and the duty of a lawyer to ensure
his client understands the terms of the prospective representation."25 3
In conclusion, the court held that because defendants "failed in this
duty, they failed to 'reasonably communicate' the forum selection clause
to the plaintiffs. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 236. Accordingly, the
plaintiffs are not bound by its terms."2 54
In addition, the court found the clause also invalid under a public
policy perspective.25 The public .policy of West Virginia required
attorneys representing criminal defendants in the state to be.answerable
to the courts of the state for their conduct:
This Court must consider the public policy .of West Virginia as
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Appeals. Applying the policies
set forth by that body, any attorney willing to undertake to represent a
criminal defendant in West Virginia must make himself available to
answer for his actions, or inaction, in the courts of this state, whether
in the context of a disciplinary proceedin or in a civil suit to be tried
before a jury of West Virginia citizens.
Enforcement of the clause would undermine this public policy:
Even if the clause had been adequately explained, the agreement as
written would preclude West Virginia courts from supervising and
sanctioning the conduct of attorneys practicing law within the state.
To condone such evasion would substantially undermine this state's
250. Id. at *16-17.




255. Id. at *17-25.
256. Id. at *22-23.
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ability to protect its citizens from unscrupulous interlopers promising
unrealistic results.257
The Court did not deny that in some other contexts a COF clause
might be enforceable.2 58 For example, in other type of disputes with
sophisticated clients, a forum selection/choice of law clause might be
enforceable.2 59  But this case involves a criminal defendant, whose
representation is an "undertaking ... of constitutional dimensions and
implicates a core function of the judicial system."26 0
"Just as allowing the assignment of malpractice actions violates the
public policy of this State, so too would allowing an attorney to avoid the
scrutiny of West Virginia's courts after purporting to provide this type of
representation."2 61
In contrast to Falk and Brown, in other cases attorneys have been
successful in enforcing COL/COF clauses. In Ginter v. Belcher,
Prendergast & Laporte,2 6 2 the Fifth Circuit found the COF clause in the
parties' attorney-client agreement was enforceable.
Paul and Lisa Ginter, a husband and wife who were residents of
South Carolina, twice hired Fred Belcher, a Louisiana family law
attorney of the firm of Belcher, Prendergast & Laporte to assist them in
the adoption of two children. The second engagement agreement
contained a choice-of-law provision (Louisiana law would govern) and
the following COF clause: "Any action at law, suit in equity, or other
judicial proceeding for the enforcement and/or breach of this contract, or
any provision thereof, shall be instituted only in the 19th Judicial District
Court of the State of Louisiana."2 63  Belcher did not suggest the
opportunity to seek independent counsel. The clause came of use when
the Ginters discovered that the second child suffered from fetal alcohol
syndrome (a consequence of the addiction of the birth mother) and sued
Belcher and his law firm in federal district court in Louisiana for
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, the allegation being that
Belcher misrepresented the health of the birth mother and failed to
thoroughly investigate the mother's health.264
Belcher filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Ginters could
only sue in the "19th Judicial District Court of the State of Louisiana,"
257. Id. at *17-18.
258. Brown, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108106, at *23.
259. Id. at *23-24 (citing XR Co. v. Block & Balestri, P.C., 44 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (D.
Fla. 1999); Ginter v. Belcher, Prendergast & Laporte, 536 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2008)).
260. Id. at *24.
261. Id. at *24-25.
262. Ginter v. Belcher, Prendergast & Laporte, 536 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2008).
263. Id. at 440.
264. Id.
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and could not sue in federal court. The district court denied the motion,
finding that the clause was the result of overreaching (being a business
transaction with a client without respecting the requirement of advising
to seek independent counsel).2 65 Belcher appealed, and the Fifth Circuit
reversed the dismissal.266
The Court found that the lower court erred in finding overreaching
because
the agreement at issue in this case is not a separate "business
transaction" between an attorney and client requiring application of
the business-transaction rules; instead, all parties agree that it is
merely an agreement consummating the attorney-client
relationship. The Ginters had no reason to believe that Belcher was
using his professional judgment to zealously protect heir interests in
the very agreement hat memorialized their relationship.267
The court also disagreed with the Ginters' argument that this COF
clause was unenforceable for violation of Louisiana public policy
because the clause was a limitation on Belcher's malpractice liability:
The thrust of the Ginters' argument is that a forum-selection clause
limits Belcher's liability because it forces the Ginters to litigate in a
forum favorable to Belcher . . . . [T]he Ginters argue, they are less
likely to recover in state court, and Belcher's attempt to have this
case litigated in state court is therefore a limitation on his malpractice
liability . . . . Nevertheless, we have some conceptual difficulty in
stretching the concept of limiting liability to cover situations where
an attorney selects a forum where he or she might have some
conceivable advantage. Our skepticism is supported by examining
how other jurisdictions have handled a related issue: whether
including mandatory-arbitration provisions (a type of forum-selection
clause) in an attorney-client agreement is a form of limiting
malpractice liability. 268
While Louisiana had no precedent on arbitration clauses in retainer
agreements, the court cited with approval the positions taken by other
jurisdictionS269 and held that:
265. Id at 441.
266. Id at 440.
267. Id. at 442.
268. Id at 442-43.
269. Id. (discussing the following opinions: Me. Prof 1 Ethics Comm'n, Op. 170
(1999); Conn. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 99-20, 1999 WL 958027, at *1 n.2 (1999); Oh. Bd.
of Comm'n on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 96-9, 1996 WL 734408, at *4 (1999)
(concluding that, while arbitration provisions are not limitations on malpractice liability,
they should not be included in engagement letters because their inclusion violates an
attorney's general duties to protect his or her "clients from agreements that do not serve
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A mandatory-arbitration clause (or any forum-selection clause) might
in a particular case give the lawyer an advantage over the client. But
a clause that has only the possibility of reducing by some small
percent the chances of an attorney's being found liable is
categorically different from a clause that truly limits liability-for
example, a clause that either directly limits liability (e.g., a hold-
harmless clause) or a clause that so handicaps a client in a
malpractice suit as to be a practical limitation on liability (e.g., a
clause requiring suit to be filed within days of the malpractice's
occurring). Other jurisdictions have recognized that requiring a client
to arbitrate is not per se a limitation on liability because requiring
arbitration does nothing more than set the litigation arena.270
The court disagreed with the Ginters that an arbitration clause was
distinguishable from a COF clause because arbitration would be
beneficial to both sides since it "streamlined procedures."
27' A client
who accepts an arbitration clause agrees to even more substantial
differences than are the result of a COF clause:
The differences between state and federal court, however, are not
nearly as substantial. Thus, there is a much stronger case for
upholding a forum-selection clause like the one at issue in this case
than an arbitration clause, where the risk of an attorney's taking
advantage of a client is greater.
272
The Court concluded that
[A] general rule that including a forum-selection clause into an
attorney-client agreement is usually not a limitation on malpractice
liability. Instead, it is only a limitation when the selected forum has
rules expressly limiting liability or if litigating in that forum would be
so unfair as to be a practical limitation on liability.273
the client's best interest"); Okla. Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm'n, Op. 312, 2000 WL
33389634, at *2-5 (2000) (determining that an arbitration clause is not a limitation on
liability because it merely determines the forum in which a case will be litigated, but
concluding that an attorney should advise the client about the differences between
litigating in a court and arbitration); New York Cty. Laws.' Assoc. Comm'n on Prof I
Ethics, Op. 723, 1997 WL 419331, at *2 (1997) (same)).
270. Id. at 443.
271. Id. at444.
272. Ginter, 536 F.3d at 444. This is the reason why the ethics committees of
Oklahoma and New York require the lawyer's detailed explanation to the client of the
consequences of an arbitration clause. See Okla. Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm'n, Op.
312, 2000 WL 33389634 at *2-5; New York Cty. Laws.' Assoc. Comm'n on Profl
Ethics, Op. 723, 1997 WL 419331 at *2.
273. Ginter, 536 F.3d at 444.
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Other courts have upheld COF and COL clauses. In In re
Agresti,274 the Texas Court of Appeals found a Colorado COL and COF
contained in an engagement agreement to be valid, but the clause was
considered as permissive (and not exclusive) and therefore could not bar
the action in Texas.275
In some cases, the courts have not engaged in special scrutiny of
COL/COF clauses. In Eaton & Van Winkle LLP v. Midway Oil Holdings
Ltd.,276 the plaintiff Eaton & Van Winkle LLP ("Eaton"), a New York
law firm, brought an action in New York to recover legal fees against its
client, Midway Oil Holdings Ltd. ("MOH"), licensed and registered in
the Turks and Caicos. The plaintiff alleged that on June 5, 2007, Eaton
executed a retainer agreement with MOH, which was signed by Mr.
Baumgart, MOH's majority owner and president and also a defendant in
the suit. In the retainer agreement, the plaintiff agreed to advise and
represent MOH in a legal matter in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York ("Libra Matter"). The firm alleged that
for more than one year (from June 2007 to July 2008), it had performed
the agreed services but MOH failed to pay the relevant legal fees,
notwithstanding that both MOH and Mr. Baumgart personally promised
to do so.2 77  After the retainer agreement was signed, another firm
represented MOH in maritime arbitration in the UK; Eaton, however,
continued to receive courtesy copies relevant to that proceeding from the
London firm and it billed for reviewing these documents. MOH
complained that Eaton was charging MOH for reading emails related to
the London matter.278
MOH contested the court had personal jurisdiction over it. The
plaintiff contended that the defendants-by establishing a continuing
attorney-client relationship with Eaton, by exchanging meetings,
telephone calls, and e-mails, and by defending the Libra Matter-
274. In re Agresti, No. 13-14-00126-CV, 2014 Tex. App. Lexis 5689 (Tex. App.
2014).
275. Id. at *2. In that case the clause read as follows:
This Agreement, and the application or interpretation thereof, shall be governed
exclusively by its terms and by the laws of the State of Colorado. You agree
that in any action relating to or arising from this Agreement, the State of
Colorado is the proper jurisdictions and that Denver is the proper venue to hear
any such action.
Id. at *4.
276. Eaton & Van Winkle LLP v. Midway Oil Holdings Ltd., No. 30549, slip op.
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 15, 2010).
277. Id. at *3-4.
278. Id. at *10, *12-13.
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"projected themselves into New York" and therefore were subject to the
long-arm jurisdiction.279
The court held that it could entertain the lawsuit against the
defendants because there is personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary
who "transacts any business" within the State, provided that the cause of
action arises out of the transaction of business.2 8 0 Among the factors281
that the court relied on to establish personal jurisdiction was the COL
clause in the retainer agreement, which stated:
This engagement and retainer agreement is governed by the laws of
the State of New York without reference to its rules regarding
conflicts of laws. The jurisdiction and forum for any claim arising
under this agreement that is not subject to arbitration under the rules
set forth above shall be exclusively the Federal or State courts located
in the County and State of New York in the United States of
.282America.
The court found personal jurisdiction over the defendants because
the defendants should have reasonably expected to defend a lawsuit
brought by the plaintiff in New York. The court relied on several factors
to support this conclusion: solicitation of the plaintiffs services in New
York, frequent communications with the plaintiff law firm, and the
choice of law clause in the Retainer agreement.28 3
The court in Eaton did not discuss any special considerations or
public policies based on the COL/COF being inserted in retainer
agreement. For example, it does not mention any informed consent
requirement. However, in Eaton the clause was only one of the factors
that the court considered important to find that the non-domiciliary had
transacted business with the state.2 84
In Beatie & Osborn LLP v. Patriot Sci. Corp.,285 the plaintiff Beatie
and Osborn, LLP ("B & 0"), a New York law firm, brought suit in New
York to collect unpaid fees from its former client Patriot Scientific
Corporation ("Patriot"), a Delaware corporation with its principal place
279. Id. at *4.
280. Id. at *18-19.
281. Id. at *21. The other two factors were the defendants having "an ongoing
contractual relationship" with the plaintiff, a New York legal firm (id. at *21, *25), and
the defendants having negotiated or executed the contract in New York (even if, in this
case, it happened through frequent, but not in person, conmunications). Id. at *26.
282. Id. at *27-28.
283. Id. at *28.
284. Id. at *21.
285. Beatie & Osborn LLP v. Patriot Sci. Corp., 431 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
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286of business in San Diego, California. In 2002, in an effort to protect
patented intellectual property through licensing and litigation, Patriot
approached the New York firm. Several telephone calls ensued. The
firm asked to associate in the case John E. Lynch, a patent specialist and
personal friend of B & O's partner Beatie.287 On November 1, 2002, the
parties signed a retainer agreement ("Retainer Agreement"), which
provided in relevant part:
This agreement and related matters not covered by the specifics of
this agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of New
York, disputes shall be resolved in the federal or state courts of the
City and State of New York, and the parties to this agreement consent
to jurisdiction and venue in the City and State of New York.288
On February 27, 2004, Patriot and B & 0 entered into another
agreement ("Fee Agreement") to specify the manner by which Patriot
would be paying for fees and expenses of patent litigation. B & 0
represented Patriot in California, as the plaintiff or the defendant, in a
total of seven lawsuits (including an action against a co-inventor of
Patriot's technology-the "Inventorship Action").289
The relationship between B & 0 and Patriot ultimately deteriorated.
In June 2005, Patriot, without the representation of B & 0, settled the
Inventorship Action and B & 0 claimed it was entitled to a portion of the
settlement.290
B & 0 filed suit against Patriot in New York. After the defendants
successfully removed the action to the Southern District of New York,
they moved to dismiss it or to transfer the case to California.291 Patriot
argued that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the
law firm would be bound to file by the California Mandatory Fee
Arbitration Act ("MFAA"), while B & 0 argued that its claims under the
Retainer Agreement were governed by New York law, not California law
and the MFAA. 292
The court agreed with B & 0 and held that New York had
jurisdiction and New York law applied.293 Because "a federal court
sitting in diversity applies the conflict-of-law rules of the forum state,,294
286. Id. at 375. B & 0 also sued on tortious interference grounds against two
individual defendants. See id.
287. Id at 376.
288. Id
289. Id
290. Id. at 377.
291. Id at 375.
292. Id at 377-78.
293. Id. at 382, 392.
294. Id at 378.
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the court applied New York law conflicts rules. Relying on established
case law,295 the court clarified that when parties have agreed on a COL
clause, a court "may refuse to enforce [it] ... only where (1) the parties'
choice has no reasonable basis or (2) application of the chosen law would
violate a fundamental public policy of another jurisdiction with
materially greater interests in the dispute."296
Here, the parties' choice of New York law clearly has a reasonable
basis: B & 0 is a New York limited liability partnership, is engaged
in the practice of law in New York, and maintains its principal place
of business in New York.297
As for the question "of whether the application of New York law
would violate a fundamental public policy of another jurisdiction with
materially greater interests in the dispute,"2 98 the court applied a two-step
analysis:
299
The Court first must determine whether California law would govern
this dispute in the absence of the parties' contractual choice-of-law
provision; and, if so, the Court must decide whether the application
of New York law would violate a fundamental public policy of
California.300
In deciding which law would govern in the absence of a clause, the
court applied the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" approach,
which is the New York conflict of law rule for contracts.30' This rule
requires a court to look at a "spectrum of significant contacts, including
the place of contracting, the places of negotiation and performance, the
location of the subject matter, and the domicile or place of business of
the contracting parties."3 02  Here the court found that California law
would apply:303  while both New York and California had contacts,
California contacts were greater because if it is true that the "Retainer
Agreement was negotiated in both New York and California, [] the bulk
295. Beatie & Osborn LLP, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 378. The court cites Radioactive, J V.
v. Manson, 153 F. Supp. 2d 462, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), citing several precedents.
296. Id. This is also the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws test, as the court
pointed out. See id. at 378 n.4 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS
§ 187(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971)).
297. Id.
2 9 8. Id.
299. Id. (referring to SG Cowen Sec. Corp. v. Messih, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6697,
at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
300. Id. at 378.
301. Id. at 379 (citing Lazard Freres & Co. v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 108 F.3d 1531,
1539 (2d Cir. 1997)).
302. Id. at 379.
303. Id.
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of B & O's representation of Patriot took place in California courts."304
The analysis, however, did not stop there:
Having found that California law would govern this dispute in the
absence of the Retainer Agreement's choice-of-law provision, the
Court must address whether applying New York law in accordance
with that provision would violate a fundamental public policy of
California. The Court answers this question in the negative.305
The court disagreed with the defendants that 'the prompt and
expeditious resolution of attorney fee disputes' in the absence of an
arbitration agreement constitutes a fundamental public policy of
California." 30 6 The defendants relied on a California Supreme Court case
for that proposition,307 but the court found that that case concerned the
California Arbitration Act ('CAA") 308 and its holding was not applicable
to the MFAA (which is the statute involved in the case). For these
reasons, the COL/COF clause in the Retainer Agreement was not to be
disturbed on public policy grounds.
Not only did the COL clause of the Retainer Agreement govern the
Retainer Agreement; the court also found that the clause governed the
claims for breach of the Fee Agreement, which had no choice of law
provision because
The Retainer Agreement's choice of law provision states that New
York law will govern 'related matters not covered by the specifics of
the Retainer Agreement . . . . The Fee Agreement governs the
manner by which Patriot is to pay to B & 0 fees and expenses
incurred during the patent litigation that was contemplated under the
Retainer Agreement.309
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Retainer Agreement's choice-
of-law provision-applies to the Fee Agreement, and consequently that
New York law applies to B & O's breach of contract claim with
respect to the Fee Agreement.310
304. Id.
305. Beatie & Osborn LLP, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
306. Id. at 381 (internal citations omitted).
307. Id. (discussing Aguilar v. Lerner, 88 P.3d 24 (Cal. 2004)).
308. See id. at 380. Aguilar was also a fee dispute between attorney and client, but
unlike in Beatie, the retainer agreement contained an arbitration clause. The Beatie court
found that the California Arbitration Act was applicable and the clause was enforceable.
The California Supreme Court held that "California has a 'strong public policy' in favor
of arbitration." Id (internal citations omitted).
309. Id. at 382 (internal citations omitted).
310. Id.
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The court denied the motion to dismiss:3 11
Because New York law applies in this action, the Court finds that
plaintiffs had no obligation to notify Patriot of its right to MFAA
arbitration before initiating an action for fees. Therefore, Patriot's
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied
with respect to B & O's claims for breach of contract, quantum
meruit, and unjust enrichment.312
Beatie & Osborn LLP v. Patriot Sci. Corp. 313 is significant because
'the court did not apply factors peculiar to retainer agreements between
lawyer and client. The COL clause in the retainer agreement was
discussed as if it were contained in an ordinary contract. The court did
not discuss or even mention the concept of informed consent by a client
or attempt to limit liability, as we have seen the courts do in Falk,314
Brown,3 15 and Ginter.316 Instead, in Beatie317 the jurisdiction of the New
York court was found on the mere basis of the COL clause.
B. What Approach Should the Courts Follow?
The cases that we have discussed can be seen as a continuum, from
cases that refuse to enforce the COL/COF clauses based on special
considerations of attorney-client relationship to cases that enforce the
clause after considerations of attorney-client relationship to cases that do
not express any concern for the special attorney-client relationship
(enforcing such clauses using the same methodology that would apply to
an agreement between commercial parties). Given this diversity in the
case law, what approach should the courts adopt?
As an initial point, we would draw two distinctions: between COL
and COF clauses and between civil litigation and disciplinary matters.
311. Id. B & 0 moved to remand the action to state court, which is not interesting for
the purpose of this paper. However, for the sake of providing context, the motion to
remand was denied because the court found that the law firm had unequivocally joined in
the notice of removal to the federal court. See id. at 384.
312. Id. at 382.
313. Beatie & Osborn LLP v. Patriot Sci. Corp., 431 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
314. See Falk & Fish, L.L.P. v. Pinkston's Lawnmower & Equip., Inc., 317 S.W.3d
523 (Tex. App. 2010).
315. See Brown v. Partipilo, No. 1:10CV110, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108106 (N.D.
W. Va. 2010).
316. See Ginter v. Belcher, Prendergast & Laporte, 536 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2008). In
Eaton & Van Winkle LLP v. Midway Oil Holdings Ltd., No. 30549, slip op. (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Mar. 15, 2010), the court did not discuss the requisite of informed consent by the
client; however, in Eaton, the clause was only one of the factors that the court used for
establishing the jurisdiction. Id. at *13.
317. Beatie & Osborn LLP, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
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1. The Standard for Enforceability of COL Clauses in Civil
Litigation
With regard to COL clauses in civil litigation, as in many areas of
the law, the fundamental values at stake are efficiency and fairness. As
to efficiency, in our judgment the current state of the law dealing with
principles governing choice of law and enforceability of selection clauses
for attorney-client engagement agreements is very costly without
corresponding gain. In the absence of a selection clause, the forum court
must determine its own choice of law principles applicable to the dispute,
it must determine the principles applied by other jurisdictions that have
an interest in the matter, and it must evaluate public policies of the
jurisdictions that are involved. If a selection clause is involved, the court
must apply a .similar analysis to the selection clause. Moreover, the
extensive judicial inquiry required by this state of the law discourages
lawyers from including selection clauses in their agreements-Why go to
the trouble when use of the clause simply creates another issue that a
disgruntled client can use to attack an engagement agreement?
We recommend that courts follow a different approach, one in
which a COL clause in an engagement agreement is enforceable so long
as the chosen law has a reasonable relationship to the contract, the
dispute, or the parties. We define "reasonable relationship" broadly. A
clause should be treated as having such a relationship if the chosen law is
that of the residence or principal place of business of the client, the place
where the lawyer or lawyers who are principally responsible for the
matter usually practice, the place of performance of the contract, or the
jurisdiction in which litigation contemplated by the engagement will take
place. In some cases multiple jurisdictions will bear a reasonable
relationship, in which case the COL clause should be enforceable for any
of these jurisdictions. We do not intend this list of jurisdictions with a
reasonable relationship to be exclusive; depending on the situation, other
jurisdictions may have a reasonable relationship to the contract, the
dispute, or the parties.
The reasonable-relationship test that we propose should be
relatively easy to administer and should encourage lawyers to include
COL clauses in their engagement agreements, hus reducing dramatically
the costs of law determination in lawyer-client disputes with
multijurisdictional aspects. But what about the fairness of this approach?
We believe that clients are adequately protected from unfair agreements
in two ways. First, the reasonable-relationship test itself incorporates
fairness. Lawyers cannot arbitrarily choose a jurisdiction that has no
relationship to the contract, the dispute, or the parties in an effort to
"cherry pick" the most favorable law. Second, public policy doctrine
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remains a check on fundamental unfairness in a choice-of-law provision.
In reviewing a COL clause, a court will consider its own public policy
and should refuse to enforce a clause if its application would violate a
fundamental public policy of the forum. Courts must, however, be
cautious in applying the public policy limitation because a broad
approach will undermine the efficiency justification for enforcement of
such clauses and indeed will call into question the strong public policy in
favor of freedom of contract. In our judgment, a court should refuse to
enforce a COL clause on public policy grounds only when the public
policy is both clear and strong.
2. The Public Policy Limitation on Enforceability of COL
Clauses
The test we propose for determining the enforceability of COL
clauses in engagement agreements is a modified version of the test used
by the court in Beatie & Osborn LLP v. Patriot Sci. Corp.318 In that case,
the court, applying New York law, upheld the plaintiffs New York
choice-of-law clause in its retainer agreement, stating that a court "may
refuse to enforce [it] . . . only where (1) the parties' choice has no
reasonable basis or (2) application of the chosen law would violate a
fundamental public policy of another jurisdiction with materially greater
interests in the dispute."1 We would modify part (2) of the test to read
"would violate a fundamental public policy of the forum." In Beatie, the
clause satisfied the reasonable-relationship test because B & 0 was a
New York limited liability partnership, was engaged in the practice of
law in New York, and maintained its principal place of business in New
York.320
Although the court in Beatie examined the public policy of the other
jurisdiction with a significant interest-California-the court's public
policy analysis is an example 'of the restrained use of public policy that
we suggest. In Beatie, the defendant had argued for dismissal of the case
claiming that the case should have been brought in California under its
Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act (MFAA). The court found that while
California did have a strong public policy in favor of arbitration, the
public policy underlying the MFAA was not sufficiently robust to
318. Beatie & Osborn LLP v. Patriot Sci. Corp., 431 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
319. Id. at 378. This is also the test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
of Laws. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 187 (AM. LAW INST.
1971).
320. Beatie & Osborn LLP, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
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override the parties' choice of law provision. The MFAA is narrowly
drawn and only applies if the client elects the procedure.3 21
The reason why we suggest adopting a modified version of Beatie,
substituting the jurisdiction with materially greater interests in the
dispute with the forum state, is again efficiency. We do not believe it is
efficient to go through the complication of conflict of laws analysis to
identity the jurisdiction with a greater interest in the dispute, only to see
whether that jurisdiction has a public policy that would bar the COL.
While there are significant differences in law among American
jurisdictions, the legal principles that reach the level of public policy are
similar. We believe that reference to the forum state to check whether a
public policy would bar the enforcement of a COL clause is a sufficient
protection.
Here is an example of a situation in which the public policy of the
forum jurisdiction might override a COL clause.322 Suppose a Minnesota
resident working in Alaska is injured in a work-related incident. The.
resident hires a Minnesota lawyer under a 25 percent contingent fee
contract to represent him in a workers' compensation case in Alaska.
The case results in an award and a fee determination by the Alaska
Compensation Board in accordance with Alaska law that provides
attorney fees using percentages that are less than the attorney would
receive under the engagement agreement. The client objects to paying
more than the amount awarded by the Alaska Board, and the attorney
brings suit in Minnesota to enforce the fee agreement. The agreement
has a reasonable relationship to Minnesota because the lawyer practices
and lives in Minnesota and the client is from Minnesota. The agreement
does not seem to violate any clear strong policy of Minnesota, so the
COL clause should be enforced, and the lawyer should receive the full 25
percent even though it is in excess of the amount awarded by the Alaska
Board (This circumstance is not unusual; lawyers may have fee
agreements in which they receive from their clients more than court
awarded fees, provided the agreement is clear on that point.). Suppose,
however, the suit was brought in Alaska (perhaps the client beats the
attorney in a race to the courthouse and sues first in Alaska). An Alaska
court might find that the COL clause for Minnesota violates a clear,
strong public policy of Alaska on the ground that the fee percentages in
Alaska are an integral part of the state's worker's compensation
system.323 On the other hand, the court might not find that Alaska has
321. Id.at380-81.
322. The fact pattern is based on Hoffman v. Henderson, 355 N.W.2d 322 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984), but has been modified to include a choice-of-law clause to illustrate the point
of when the forum's public policy might override a choice-of-law clause.
323. See Hoffmnan, 355 N.W.2d at 324.
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such a clear, strong public policy. The fee awards in Alaska might not be
caps; they might simply be fee awards with the attorney and client free to
agree on a greater attorney fee. An Alaska court would have to decide
the clarity and strength of the Alaskan public policy with regard to
workers' compensation fee awards.
3. Should COL Clauses be Subject to an Informed Consent?
Should a COL clause be subject to a requirement of informed
consent? As an initial matter, the ethics rules impose a requirement of
informed consent in a number of situations (e.g., limited engagement
agreements require informed consent,3 2 4 waiver of conflict of interest
requires informed consent,3 25 and business transaction with clients
require informed consent among other requirements32 6), but no ethics
rule requires informed consent to a COL clause. In fact, the ethics rules
do not deal with COL clauses. The only mention of choice of law is in
the recent amendment to Comment [5] to Rule 8.5,327 adopted based on
the work of the Ethics Commission 20/20,328 which allows the parties to
a retainer agreement to specify the application of the rules of a certain
jurisdiction with which the parties have a significant relationship to
govern conflict of interest issues. The comment that was approved by
the House of Delegates-and that follows verbatim the recommendation
of the Commission-requires informed consent for that type of
agreement to be valid. 32 9 However, there is no indication that the
324. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(c) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
325. Id. at r. 1.7(b)(4).
326. Id. at r. 1.8(a).
327. Id. at r. 8.5 cmt. 5. The comment provides that:
When a lawyer's conduct involves significant contacts with more than one
jurisdiction, it may not be clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer's
conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conduct
occurred. So long as the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a
jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will
occur, the lawyer shall not be subject to discipline under this Rule. With
respect to conflicts of interest, in determining a lawyer's reasonable belief
under paragraph (b)(2), a written agreement between the lawyer and client that
reasonably specifies a particular jurisdiction as within the scope of that
paragraph may be considered if the agreement was obtained with the client's
informed consent confirmed in the agreement.
Id.
328. See generally ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20: ABA Midyear Meeting, February
2013, AM. BAR Ass'N http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/
abacommissionon ethics 20_20.html (last updated 2017).
329. See ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Report to the House ofDelegates (AM. BAR
Ass'N, Proposed Resolution Draft 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
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Commission. expressly considered the necessity of requiring informed
consent or difficulties in application of the concept before making the
recommendation.330 In fact, there is no discussion of the requirement in
the Commission's Report. Therefore, currently the rules of ethics do not
expressly require informed consent for a COL clause. Moreover,
Comment [5] to Rule 8.5 is an ethics rule, which need not apply in a
choice-of-law dispute for civil liability purposes.
We think that a requirement of informed consent should not apply
to COL clauses for reasons both of practicality and fairness. The concept
of informed consent, which is taken from the Rules of Professional
Conduct, requires a lawyer to explain to the client the advantages,
disadvantages, and alternatives to a proposed course of conduct.331
Imagine a COL clause in which the engagement agreement identifies the
law of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally practices, and that
this jurisdiction is different from that of the client's residence. What
would the lawyer be required to do to obtain the client's informed
consent? The lawyer would have to identify the possible jurisdictions for
choice of law, which might include jurisdictions other than those where
the lawyer practices and the client resides. The lawyer would then have
to explain to the client the advantages and disadvantages for the client of
each jurisdiction's law. This would be so time-consuming that no lawyer
would do it; moreover, the task would be impossible because the lawyer
could not know in advance what issue or issues might be involved in a
dispute with the client: statute of limitations? Fee caps? Lawyer liens?
Fee splitting? This is similar to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in
quantum mechanics.332 Because we do not know what issues will arise,
it is impossible, when the retainer agreement is entered into, to discuss
with the client the advantages and disadvantages of a COL clause, except
in a very general sense, which would be meaningless to the client.333
/administrative/ethics_2020/20121112_ethics20_20_choice of rule resolution and rep
ort final.authcheckdam.pdf. 4
330. See id
331. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.0(e). See also id. at cmt. 6-7.
332. Uncertainty Principle, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
science/uncertainty-principle (last visited Mar. 26, 2017). The principle states that "the
position and the velocity of an object cannot both be measured exactly, at the same time,
even in theory." Id. See also The Uncertainty Principle, GA. STATE UNIV.,
http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/uncer.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
333. If it were possible to identify both the jurisdictions whose law might be chosen
and the issues that would arise in a future dispute, it would be possible to draft a
disclosure clause. For example, let's say that New York and South Carolina are the
jurisdictions whose law might be chosen. The lawyer could, for example, say: "This
agreement is governed by New York law excluding its choice of law rules. New York
law may have advantages and disadvantages to you depending on the particular issue
involved. For example, under New York law, any retainer that you pay can be deposited
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Moreover, as a matter of fairness, clients do not need the protection
of informed consent to COL clauses. Often when the ethics rules impose
a requirement of informed consent it is because the lawyer is seeking
protection from responsibility.334 This is not the case with COL clauses.
Usually the choice of law will not give a particular advantage to a lawyer
(and if it does, the advantage will usually be unknown at the time of the
engagement and could just as easily have turned out to be favorable to
the client). What the COL clause actually does is to clarify the
relationship by identifying the applicable law, not relieve the lawyer of
responsibility. In addition, for the reasons set forth above, clients already
have the protection of fairness through the reasonable relationship and
public policy limitations on the enforceability of COL clauses.
4. Enforceability of COF Clauses in Civil Litigation
Suppose the engagement agreement has a COF clause, which may
or may not be coupled with a COL clause. What should be the standard
for enforceability of such clauses? As discussed in Part II(A), a number
of courts have referred to the need for informed consent o COF clauses.
In addition, ethics opinions have advised that arbitration clauses, which
are a type of COF, are subject to the requirement of informed consent.335
A COF clause potentially has a greater impact on a client than a COL
clause because it can require the client to incur the expense to retain
counsel or go personally or both to another jurisdiction to enforce or
defend a claim against a lawyer. Therefore, in our view, lawyers using
COF clauses should be required to warn the client if the COL clause is
in my operating account and I am not required to deposit it into my trust account. Had
South Carolina law be applicable, I would be required to deposit any unearned fee in my
trust account, which would be more protective for you. Whether New York or South
Carolina law is more advantageous to you depends on the particular issue which we
cannot know at this time."
The problem is that it is impossible to know at the time of the engagement what issues
might arise in the future, and it is therefore impossible to inform the client of the relative
advantages and isadvantages of a choice of law. In fact, informed consent is more
complex because a lawyer would also have to advise the client of the consequences of
having no choice-of-law clause.
334. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT rr. 1.8(a), 1.7(b)(4). The prime example is
the business transaction with the client, which requires informed consent, besides fairness
and the advice to seek independent representation. See id. r. 1.8(a). Another example is
in conflict of interest situations: Model Rule 1.7(b)(4), in most cases, allows a lawyer
who faces a conflict of interest to accept or continue the representation, if he or she
obtains the informed consent of the client. Several other examples could be made and
would show that the function of requiring informed consent is typically when the lawyer
is in some way limiting his or her responsibility to the client. Id. at r. 1.7(b)(4).
335. See Nathan M. Crystal, Ethics Watch: Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in
Engagement Agreements, 28 S. C. LAWYER 11, 11 (Sept. 2016).
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for a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction of the client's residence (or
principal place of business in case of a business). We believe that a
client's consent will be informed if the engagement includes a notice like
the following:
THIS ENGAGEMENT PROVIDES THAT ANY CLAIM BY OR
AGAINST [NAME OF LAWYER] MUST BE BROUGHT
[SPECIFY THE CHOICE OF FORUM]. CLIENT
UNDERSTANDS THAT HE CANNOT BRING A CLAIM
AGAINST LAWYER IN ANY OTHER PLACE. CLIENT MAY
INCUR EXPENSE AND LOSS OF TIME TO BRING OR DEFEND
AGAINST A CLAIM IN THAT FORUM. BY SIGNING THIS
AGREEMENT CLIENT GIVES HIS INFORMED CONSENT TO
THIS CHOICE OF FORUM.
5. Are COL/COF Clauses Enforceable as to Legal Malpractice
and Other Tort Claims?
Should the enforceability of COL/COF clauses be limited to
contractual disputes or should they cover tort matters, such as legal
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and the like? One issue that
may arise with regard to such claims is whether the COL/COF clause
applies to such claims. Careful drafting is important. The clause should
not be limited to claims "for breach of this engagement or contract."
Instead, the clause should apply to any claim for breach of. this
agreement, any claim arising out of or related to this agreement, or any
claim arising out of or related to the relationship between the parties to
this agreement or their agents and employees.
. Aside from drafting, as a matter of policy should COL/COF clauses
be limited to claims for breach of the agreement? Our emphatic answer.
is "No." These clauses, if properly drafted, should cover all claims,
whether in contract or tort, arising from the engagement or the attorney-
client relationship. We have several reasons. First, if these clauses are
limited to contract claims, it will lead to "splitting of causes of action"
with contract claims subject to one set of laws and fora, while others
become subject o different law and different fora. Such a situation
leading to multiple lawsuits is highly inefficient and unfair to both
parties. Second, causes of action for legal malpractice and breach of
contract can be subject to COF clauses for arbitration.336 There is no
reason why both tort and contract claims should not be subject to both
COL and COF clauses. Further, limited case law supports the
proposition that COL clauses covering legal malpractice claims are
336. See id. at 13.
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enforceable. In Rogers v. Lee3 37 (discussed in Part II), the South
Carolina Court of Appeals held that the choice-of-law clause in the
attorney's engagement agreement, which selected North Carolina law,
applied in a legal malpractice action brought by the client in South
Carolina. As a result, North Carolina's four-year statute of repose
applied to the plaintiffs claim, resulting in summary judgment for the
defendant lawyer.338
6. Enforceability of COL Clauses in Disciplinary Proceedings
The choice of law in breach of contract or legal malpractice actions
is different from the choice of law in disciplinary proceedings, which is
governed by Model Rule 8.5 (and its state equivalents). That rule
provides that in case of litigation matters, the ethics rules of the
jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits control,339 while in nonlitigation
matters, the rules of "the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's conduct"
occurred control, unless "the predominant effect of the conduct is in a
different jurisdiction" in which case the rules of that jurisdiction apply.34 0
A lawyer's engagement agreement with a client cannot dictate
either choice of disciplinary forum or choice of law before a disciplinary
body. However, if an engagement agreement contains a valid COL and
the lawyer conforms his conduct to the law of the chosen jurisdiction that
may be relevant in determining whether the lawyer is subject to
discipline. ABA Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) provides:
A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's conduct
conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably
believes the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur.34
In addition, Comment [5] to Rule 8.5 specifies that a COL with
regard to interest may be given effect to determine where the
predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct occurred:
With respect to conflicts of interest, in determining a lawyer's
reasonable belief under paragraph (b)(2), a written agreement
. between the lawyer and client that reasonably specifies a particular
jurisdiction as within the scope of that paragraph may be considered
if the agreement was obtained with the client's informed consent
confirmed in the agreement.342
337. Rogers v. Lee, 777 S.E.2d 402, 406 (S.C. Ct. App. 2015).
338. Id. at 407-08.
339. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.5(b)(1).
340. Id. at r. 8.5(b)(2).
341. Id.
342. Id. at r. 8.5 cmt [5].
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C. Drafting Considerations
Considering the variation of the case law on the issue of the
enforceability of choice of forum/choice of law clauses, it is impossible
to give general guidelines on the enforceability of a COL/COF clause in
a retainer agreement. However, we can offer some thoughts that could
guide lawyers' conduct on this aspect. First, do not make clerical
mistakes as in Falk;3 4 3 they cannot help and may create either
ambiguities or a conclusion that the agreement lacks informed consent.
The case law warns against the risk of "sloppy drafting" of forum
selection clauses in retainer agreements.34 Second, do not try to use the
choice of law/choice of forum as a substitute for a limitation of liability
clause, as was the situation in Ginter;345 the court might find the clause
unenforceable on that basis. Third, discuss with your client (especially if
the client is not sophisticated) the clause and explain the consequences of
that clause or you might be denied the benefit of the COL clause, as was
the result in Brown v. Partipilo.346 While we argue in this article that
courts should not require informed consent to enforce COL clauses,
many courts may make this analysis, so prudent lawyers will seek
informed consent. Fourth, do not overreach: the choice of law and
forum must bear a reasonable relationship with the parties and the
circumstances as in Beatie.347 Include in the clause language showing a
reasonable relationship between the chosen law and the agreement, the
parties, or the dispute. If you are a South Carolina firm, with principal
place of business in Hilton Head, and you assist a South Carolina client,
your choice of Wyoming law and Cheyenne courts is likely to be seen as
unreasonable (even without disturbing forum non conveniens or closed
door statutes). Fifth, if the relationship with your client is grounded on
several documents (as it was the case in Beatie348 where there was a
Retainer Agreement and a Fee Agreement), make sure to insert the same
clause in both. The Beatie court found that the COL clause also
governed the document in which it was not contained, but again your
court might not be so generous. Sixth, include an appropriate warning to
obtain informed client consent to a COF clause (see above).
343. See Falk & Fish, L.L.P. v. Pinkston's Lawnmower & Equip., Inc., 317 S.W.3d
523 (Tex. App. 2010).
344. Id. at 528-29.
345. See generally Ginter v. Belcher, Prendergast & Laporte, 536 F.3d 439 (5th Cir.
2008).
346. See generally Brown v. Partipilo, No. 1:1OCV110, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108106 (N.D. W. Va. 2010).
347. See generally Beatie & Osborn LLP v. Patriot Sci. Corp., 431 F. Supp. 2d 367,
378 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
348. Id. at 376.
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Even if COL and COF clauses in engagement agreements are
possible, "[plarticular care is in order because agreements between a
lawyer and client are interpreted from the reasonable client's perspective,
meaning that the client will typically get the benefit of the doubt when
contract language is ambiguous or unclear."3 4
9
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article we have discussed the complicated analysis that
courts must use when a lawyer's engagement agreement does not contain
a COL/COF clause. Our discussion has concentrated on malpractice,
attorneys' liens, and fee cap issues, but similar complications exist in
other aspects of the attorney-client relationship. In the absence of a
COL/COF clause, a court must determine its own choice-of-law
principles applicable to the dispute, and it must evaluate public policies
of other jurisdictions that have an interest in the matter.
We have also examined the judicial approaches when lawyers'
engagement agreements contain COL/COF clauses. If a COL/COF
clause is involved, the court must apply a similar analysis to the selection
clause.
The extensive judicial inquiry required by this state of the law
discourages lawyers from including selection clauses in their agreements.
This situation creates uncertainty because parties cannot anticipate which
law courts will apply to any of the varied disputes that might arise. In
short, the present situation is unfair and inefficient to both client and
lawyer.
We believe that COL /COF clauses-absent overreaching-serve
fairness and efficiency goals although they should be treated somewhat
differently. In our view, courts should generally enforce COL clauses if
(1) the law chosen has a reasonable relationship to the engagement
agreement, the parties, or the dispute, and (2) application of the chosen
law does not violate a clear, strong public policy of the forum. COL
clauses should not be subject to a requirement of informed consent. By
contrast, COF clauses should be enforced if the same requirements of
reasonable relationship and no violation of public policy exist but should
also be subject to informed consent for the reasons detailed in this paper.
If courts follow our proposals, we believe that the enforceability of COL
and COF clauses will be much clearer, that lawyers will have an
incentive to include such clauses in their engagements, and that fair
treatment of clients will not suffer.
349. Green, supra note 229, at 6.
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